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Abstract	  
This	  paper	  examines	  the	  history	  of	  civil	  military	  relations	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Argentina	  in	  an	  
attempt	  to	  understand	  why	  Mexico	  was	  able	  to	  subordinate	  its	  military	  following	  the	  fall	  of	  
the	  Porfírian	  military	  regime,	  while	  Argentina	  experienced	  decades	  of	  military	  intervention	  
into	  the	  civilian	  sphere.	  	  It	  argues	  that	  strong	  governmental	  and	  political	  institutions	  in	  
Mexico	  were	  the	  key	  to	  subordinating	  the	  Mexican	  military	  to	  civilian	  control,	  while	  patterns	  
of	  populist	  political	  movements	  in	  Argentina	  hampered	  the	  formation	  of	  strong	  governmental	  
institutions	  that	  would	  have	  enabled	  the	  subordination	  of	  the	  military	  to	  civilian	  control.	  	  	  
Introduction	  
Max	  Weber	  famously	  defined	  the	  state	  as	  "a	  human	  community	  that	  successfully	  claims	  the	  monopoly	  of	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  physical	  force	  within	  a	  given	  territory."1	  	  This	  definition	  necessarily	  grants	  great	  power	  and	  influence	  to	  the	  armed	  forces	  within	  the	  system	  of	  the	  state,	  as	  without	  them	  no	  government	  could	  hope	  to	  claim	  any	  sort	  of	  monopoly	  over	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  physical	  force	  within	  its	  territory.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  one	  agrees	  with	  the	  strict	  Weberian	  conception	  of	  statehood,	  or	  believes	  that	  the	  matter	  is	  of	  a	  more	  complex	  nature,	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  deny	  his	  conclusions	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  control	  of	  legitimate	  violence	  that	  a	  functional	  state	  must	  possess.	  	  Yet	  in	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  states	  today,	  and	  throughout	  recent	  history,	  the	  armed	  forces	  have	  not	  been	  both	  the	  dominant	  political	  actors	  in	  their	  respective	  countries	  as	  well	  as	  the	  guardians	  of	  the	  monopoly	  over	  legitimate	  violence.	  	  One	  of	  the	  most	  central	  questions	  facing	  state	  makers,	  political	  scientists,	  and	  governments	  throughout	  the	  world	  is	  how	  and	  why	  a	  country's	  military	  can	  and	  should	  be	  subordinated	  to	  civilian	  control.	  	  History	  has	  shown	  us	  the	  disastrous	  consequences	  for	  societies	  whose	  militaries	  intervene	  in	  politics,	  and	  no	  one	  can	  legitimately	  claim	  that	  a	  society	  can	  benefit	  more	  from	  having	  a	  military	  government	  than	  a	  functioning	  civilian	  government	  with	  a	  fully	  subordinated	  military.	  	  The	  question	  of	  how	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 1919, 1, http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber-
Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf. 
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civilian	  government	  can	  subordinate	  its	  military	  remains	  important	  and	  topical,	  yet	  the	  answers	  for	  effective	  subordination	  likely	  lie	  within	  the	  annals	  of	  history,	  which	  certainly	  contain	  a	  plethora	  of	  attempts	  at	  military	  subordination,	  both	  successful	  and	  not.	  
	   The	  20th	  century	  was	  a	  tumultuous	  one	  for	  governments	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  During	  this	  time	  period	  no	  less	  than	  38	  successful	  coup	  d’état’s	  occurred	  in	  the	  region,	  most	  of	  them	  with	  the	  active	  participation	  of	  the	  military.	  	  Military	  intervention	  in	  government	  was	  so	  common	  that,	  other	  than	  Mexico,	  every	  single	  country	  in	  Latin	  America	  experienced	  some	  sort	  of	  direct	  military	  intervention	  in	  government	  from	  the	  1930’s	  onward.2	  	  Following	  the	  overthrow	  of	  the	  Porfirio	  Díaz	  regime	  in	  1910,	  and	  the	  10	  years	  of	  anarchy	  known	  as	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution,	  the	  Mexican	  military	  was	  gradually	  subordinated	  to	  civilian	  control,	  and	  no	  military	  faction	  would	  even	  attempt	  to	  wrest	  power	  from	  civilian	  hands	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  Mexico’s	  modern	  history.	  
	   On	  the	  flip	  side,	  Argentina,	  which	  at	  one	  point	  in	  its	  history	  seemed	  destined	  to	  become	  the	  dominant	  economic	  power	  in	  Latin	  America,	  and	  in	  some	  minds,	  the	  world,	  experienced	  a	  century	  full	  of	  political	  turmoil	  and	  instability	  that	  was	  chock	  full	  of	  military	  interventions	  and	  usurpations	  of	  the	  civilian	  government’s	  authority.	  	  This	  cycle	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  government	  culminated	  in	  the	  military	  junta	  that	  overthrew	  Isabel	  Perón’s	  civilian	  government	  in	  1976	  and	  tragically	  resulted	  in	  the	  clandestine	  disappearance	  and	  murder	  of	  approximately	  30,000	  Argentineans.	  It	  was	  only	  after	  the	  horrors	  of	  this	  final	  military	  junta	  that	  Argentina	  was	  finally	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  consistent	  pattern	  of	  civilian	  rule	  that	  has	  continued	  through	  today.	  	  What	  differentiated	  the	  experiences	  of	  Mexico	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Rodric A. Camp, "Groups and the State," in Politics in Mexico, 6th ed. (New York: Oxford UP, 2014), 146. 	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Argentina;	  why	  was	  Mexico	  able	  to	  successfully	  subordinate	  its	  military	  to	  civilian	  rule,	  while	  Argentina	  failed	  repeatedly	  in	  this	  effort?	  	  	  
	   The	  story	  starts	  with	  the	  differentiating	  histories	  of	  the	  two	  countries.	  	  Following	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  the	  Porfirian	  military	  dictatorship,	  a	  military	  government	  was	  incompatible	  with	  the	  desires	  of	  Mexican	  society	  and	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  new	  regime.	  	  An	  institutionally	  strong	  government	  was	  created,	  led	  by	  a	  super	  presidency	  to	  which	  all	  other	  organs	  and	  institutions	  of	  government,	  including	  the	  armed	  forces,	  would	  eventually	  subordinate	  themselves.	  	  Helped	  by	  strong	  leadership,	  Mexico	  was	  able	  to	  establish	  a	  strong	  single	  party	  political	  system	  that	  would	  assume	  control	  of	  the	  Presidential	  succession	  process	  from	  the	  military,	  and	  further	  remove	  the	  armed	  forces	  from	  the	  political	  sphere.	  	  Bolstered	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  any	  strong,	  consistent	  subversive	  threat	  to	  the	  government,	  Mexico	  was	  able	  to	  manage	  external	  influences	  that	  under	  other	  circumstances	  could	  have	  pressured	  a	  military	  intervention	  in	  government.	  	  Argentina’s	  history	  is	  littered	  with	  military	  coups	  and	  failures	  of	  democratically	  elected	  governments	  to	  succeed	  in	  establishing	  strong	  political	  traditions	  and	  institutions.	  	  The	  history	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  Argentina	  is	  so	  strong	  that	  even	  their	  most	  famous	  democratically	  elected	  leader,	  Juan	  Domingo	  Perón,	  initially	  came	  to	  power	  as	  part	  of	  a	  military	  coup.	  	  The	  people	  of	  Argentina	  became	  so	  desensitized	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  government	  that	  many	  of	  them	  actually	  called	  for	  a	  military	  takeover	  to	  help	  restore	  order	  to	  the	  increasingly	  fractionalized	  and	  polarized	  Argentinean	  society	  in	  the	  years	  immediately	  preceding	  the	  final	  military	  junta	  of	  1976.	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   The	  institutional	  power	  of	  the	  presidency	  in	  Mexico	  enabled	  the	  Mexican	  military	  to	  feel	  secure	  as	  its	  influence	  was	  slowly	  removed	  from	  the	  political	  arena	  and	  it	  became	  completely	  subordinate	  to	  civilian	  rule.	  	  Argentina’s	  rulers	  used	  populist	  techniques	  to	  secure	  support	  for	  their	  candidacies	  and	  governments,	  creating	  a	  political	  environment	  where	  the	  government’s	  legitimacy	  was	  based	  on	  the	  power	  of	  particular	  rulers	  and	  their	  ideologies,	  with	  no	  strong	  government	  institutions	  to	  back	  them	  up.	  	  This	  allowed	  the	  military	  to	  become	  the	  most	  or	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  political	  actors	  in	  Argentina	  throughout	  the	  20th	  century	  due	  to	  its	  institutional	  strength,	  support	  from	  various	  oligarchical	  sectors	  of	  society,	  and	  a	  willingness	  to	  interfere	  in	  politics,	  which	  made	  military	  intervention	  in	  government	  a	  constant	  threat	  or	  reality.	  	  The	  differing	  historical	  experiences	  of	  Mexico	  and	  Argentina	  determined	  each	  country's	  respective	  abilities	  to	  develop	  strong	  governmental	  and	  political	  institutions.	  	  These	  were	  the	  key	  determinants	  of	  each	  country’s	  capacity	  to	  subordinate	  their	  militaries	  to	  civilian	  control,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  civilian	  government’s	  capability	  to	  establish	  itself	  as	  the	  dominant	  power	  holder	  over	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  force	  within	  society.	  	  It	  will	  be	  suggested	  that	  this	  factor	  could	  also	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  applicable	  in	  similar	  situations	  throughout	  the	  world.	  	  
The	  first	  section	  of	  this	  study	  will	  examine	  the	  general	  literature	  on	  civil	  military	  relations.	  	  It	  will	  develop	  a	  framework	  in	  which	  we	  can	  then	  contextualize	  and	  examine	  the	  historical	  events	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  differing	  manifestations	  of	  civil	  military	  relations	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Argentina.	  The	  second	  section	  will	  examine	  Argentina's	  pattern	  of	  populist	  political	  movements	  which	  prompted	  repeated	  military	  interventions	  in	  government	  throughout	  Argentinean	  history,	  and	  will	  show	  that	  this	  pattern	  prevented	  the	  formation	  of	  strong	  civilian	  political	  institutions,	  which,	  in	  tandem	  with	  a	  highly	  polarized	  society,	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culminated	  in	  the	  final	  military	  junta	  of	  1976	  that	  would	  forever	  change	  Argentinean	  society.	  	  In	  the	  third	  section,	  I	  will	  look	  at	  Mexico's	  socio-­‐political	  history	  and	  show	  how	  after	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  the	  development	  of	  an	  institutionally	  strong	  civilian	  government	  subordinate	  to	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency	  resulted	  in	  the	  effective	  subordination	  of	  the	  Mexican	  military	  to	  civilian	  control.	  	  The	  next	  section	  provide	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  two	  countries	  governments’	  and	  militaries’	  reactions	  to	  subversive	  threats	  within	  society	  as	  a	  method	  for	  understanding	  the	  importance	  in	  strong	  governmental	  institutions	  in	  allowing	  Mexico's	  civilian	  government	  to	  subordinate	  its	  armed	  forces,	  while	  the	  threat	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  Argentina	  was	  ever	  present	  until	  years	  after	  the	  final	  restoration	  of	  Argentinean	  democracy.	  	  Finally,	  I	  will	  briefly	  present	  the	  case	  that	  these	  conclusions	  are	  likely	  not	  applicable	  solely	  to	  the	  Mexican	  and	  Argentinean	  cases,	  but	  that	  these	  patterns	  can	  be	  seen	  throughout	  the	  world	  in	  countries	  that	  effectively	  subordinated	  their	  militaries	  to	  civilian	  control	  such	  as	  India,	  China,	  and	  others.	  	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  governmental	  institutions	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Argentina	  was	  the	  most	  important	  factor	  in	  determining	  each	  country’s	  ability	  to	  subordinate	  their	  military	  to	  civilian	  control	  due	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  these	  institutions	  to	  create	  a	  stable	  political	  sphere	  that	  the	  military	  could	  trust	  to	  react	  appropriately	  to	  perceived	  threats,	  develop	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  military	  could	  be	  depoliticized	  and	  professionalized,	  and	  remove	  the	  incentive	  for	  militaries	  to	  directly	  intervene	  through	  their	  capability	  to	  effectively	  rule	  and	  transition	  power	  legitimately	  when	  the	  ruling	  group	  is	  failing	  in	  its	  duties.	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   While	  militaries	  in	  the	  modern	  world	  usually	  occupy	  a	  subservient	  role	  to	  their	  civilian	  governments,	  this	  is	  not	  an	  intuitive	  position	  for	  them	  to	  hold.	  	  For	  most	  of	  human	  history,	  the	  control	  of	  a	  country	  or	  region	  was	  determined	  by	  whoever	  could	  maintain	  and	  control	  the	  largest	  army	  to	  fight	  off	  other	  would	  be	  rulers.	  	  But	  with	  a	  growing	  need	  for	  complex	  political	  organizations,	  and	  the	  shift	  away	  from	  feudal	  systems	  of	  government,	  new	  theories	  were	  needed	  to	  understand	  the	  military’s	  acceptance	  of	  a	  subservient	  role	  to	  the	  emerging	  civilian	  governments.	  	  Samuel	  Huntington	  famously	  described	  two	  types	  of	  civilian	  control	  in	  the	  modern	  world,	  subjective	  and	  objective	  control.	  	  Subjective	  civilian	  control	  is	  the	  maximization	  of	  the	  power	  of	  certain	  civilian	  groups	  over	  the	  military	  such	  that	  the	  military	  is	  dependent	  on	  these	  groups	  for	  power,	  influence,	  and	  funding	  within	  the	  state	  structure.3	  In	  a	  state	  where	  the	  civilian	  sector	  maintains	  subjective	  control	  over	  the	  military,	  different	  civilian	  groups	  compete	  for	  power	  and	  influence	  within	  the	  armed	  forces.4	  	  Subjective	  control	  denies	  the	  existence	  of	  an	  independent	  military	  sphere,	  and	  maximizes	  the	  power	  of	  particular	  governmental	  institutions,	  social	  classes,	  and	  constitutional	  forms.5	  	  	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  subjective	  control	  can	  only	  exist	  in	  modern	  western	  democracies,	  as	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  all	  types	  of	  governments	  including	  various	  types	  of	  autocratic	  states	  in	  which	  the	  ruler	  or	  rulers	  are	  citizens	  and	  not	  military	  men.6	  	  At	  its	  most	  base	  level,	  subjective	  civilian	  control	  means	  that	  the	  military	  is	  not	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Samuel P. Huntington. "Power, Professionalism, and Ideology: Civil-Military Relations in Theory," in The Soldier 
and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-military Relations. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1957), 80-81. 
4 Ibid., 81. 
5 Ibid., 81-83.  
6 Ibid., 82. 
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subordinate	  to	  the	  state	  and	  its	  interests,	  but	  rather	  to	  group	  or	  personal	  interests	  that	  exist	  within	  the	  state	  apparatus.7	  
	   With	  the	  recent	  move	  in	  Western	  industrialized	  democracies	  towards	  the	  autonomous	  professionalization	  of	  the	  military,	  and	  an	  acknowledgment	  of	  a	  separate	  sector	  in	  society	  that	  is	  the	  military	  class,	  a	  different	  type	  of	  civilian	  control	  is	  needed	  to	  describe	  the	  emerging	  form	  of	  military	  subordination.	  	  Objective	  civilian	  control	  is	  based	  in	  the	  maximization	  of	  military	  professionalism.	  	  It	  militarizes	  the	  military,	  thus	  making	  it	  a	  tool	  of	  the	  state,	  rather	  than	  of	  any	  particular	  interest	  group	  within	  the	  state.8	  An	  objectively	  controlled	  military	  should	  have	  autonomy	  over	  the	  development	  of	  its	  professional	  apparatus,	  though	  its	  education	  should	  remain	  parallel	  to	  the	  goals	  and	  interests	  of	  the	  state	  that	  it	  defends,	  while	  its	  policy	  objectives	  should	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  civilian	  government.9	  	  Objective	  control	  is	  preferable	  to	  subjective	  control,	  as	  it	  reduces	  military	  political	  power	  to	  the	  lowest	  possible	  level,	  while	  still	  making	  the	  military	  an	  effective	  defender	  of	  national	  interests.	  
	   The	  objective	  control	  model	  of	  civil	  military	  relations	  is	  generally	  considered	  possible	  only	  within	  highly	  developed	  Western	  industrial	  democracies.	  	  In	  any	  type	  of	  system	  other	  than	  this,	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  the	  military	  serves	  a	  particular	  interest	  group	  whether	  that	  is	  a	  political	  party,	  particular	  social	  class,	  or	  a	  particular	  ruler,	  rather	  than	  the	  state	  itself.	  	  However,	  it	  has	  recently	  been	  argued	  that	  with	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  modern	  world,	  the	  objective	  model	  of	  control	  that	  features	  a	  completely	  apolitical	  military	  is	  no	  longer	  possible	  or	  desirable.	  	  The	  equilibrium	  model	  of	  civilian	  control,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7Ibid., 85.	  
8	  Samuel P. Huntington, Power, Professionalism, and Ideology, 83. 
9 Ibid.	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proposed	  by	  Sarkesian,	  believes	  that	  modern	  militaries	  are	  forced	  by	  the	  geo-­‐political	  realities	  of	  the	  world	  to	  understand	  and	  engage	  in,	  at	  minimal	  capacity,	  political	  decisions	  with	  which	  the	  military	  sphere	  has	  relevant	  knowledge	  or	  experience.	  	  In	  the	  equilibrium	  model,	  the	  armed	  forces	  exist	  for	  the	  sole	  purpose	  of	  defending	  and	  supporting	  the	  democratic	  political-­‐social	  order,	  which	  is	  understood	  and	  guided	  by	  their	  high	  level	  of	  professionalism	  based	  on	  the	  morals	  and	  ethics	  of	  the	  state	  they	  represent.10	  Yet	  this	  professionalism	  can	  and	  indeed	  must	  now	  include	  political	  elements	  and	  understanding,	  as	  politics	  are	  key	  in	  developing	  modern	  military	  policy	  and	  understanding	  the	  effects	  that	  military	  action	  can	  have	  on	  the	  socio-­‐political	  environment	  of	  the	  world.11	  This	  model	  is	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  threats	  for	  highly	  developed	  democracies	  throughout	  the	  world,	  and	  is	  likely	  a	  better	  descriptor	  for	  civil	  military	  relations	  in	  developed	  democracies	  in	  the	  modern	  era.	  	  	  
	   However,	  not	  all	  countries	  in	  the	  world	  are	  democracies.	  	  Civil	  military	  relationships	  in	  states	  with	  dictatorial	  rulers,	  one-­‐party	  systems,	  or	  communist	  systems	  are	  in	  many	  senses	  different	  from	  those	  in	  Western	  democracies.	  	  In	  personal,	  non-­‐military	  dictatorships,	  the	  ruler	  often	  personally	  controls	  the	  armed	  forces	  though	  cronies	  in	  the	  military,	  while	  simultaneously	  factionalizing	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  prevent	  one	  sector	  from	  gaining	  enough	  power	  to	  seize	  control.12	  	  The	  military	  is	  likely	  used	  as	  the	  dictator’s	  primary	  mechanism	  for	  maintaining	  power,	  and	  thus	  wields	  considerable	  political	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  S. C. Sarkesian, "Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West," International Political 
Science Review, 1981, 290-91, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1601063.  
11	  Ibid., 294.  
12	  Samuel Huntington, “Reforming Civil-Military Relations,” in Civil-Military Relations and Democracy. 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 4. 
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influence	  as	  well.	  	  In	  one	  party	  states,	  the	  military	  is	  often	  incorporated	  into	  the	  party	  system,	  and	  gives	  its	  loyalty	  to	  the	  party	  and	  party	  interests,	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  state.13	  Communist	  governments	  have	  a	  similar	  system,	  in	  which	  the	  military	  is	  an	  instrument	  of	  the	  party	  that	  is	  necessary	  for	  bringing	  the	  party	  to	  power,	  and	  then	  keeping	  it	  there	  once	  rule	  has	  been	  established.14	  	  Most	  high-­‐ranking	  military	  officers	  are	  in	  fact	  communist	  party	  members,	  and	  many	  also	  hold	  important	  positions	  on	  high-­‐ranking	  party	  boards.15	  	  Thus,	  the	  party	  and	  the	  army	  exist	  in	  symbiosis,	  neither	  would	  be	  an	  effective	  ruler	  nor	  tool	  without	  the	  support	  of	  its	  counterpart.	  	  All	  of	  these	  systems	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  possessing	  varying	  levels	  of	  subjective	  control	  of	  their	  militaries,	  due	  to	  the	  military’s	  allegiance	  to	  various	  special	  interests	  groups	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  state	  itself.	  	  	  
	   In	  an	  ideal	  world	  it	  seems	  as	  though	  all	  militaries	  would	  be	  objectively	  controlled	  by	  their	  civilian	  governments,	  thus	  eliminating	  all	  possibility	  of	  intervention	  in	  the	  political	  system.	  	  Yet	  this	  is	  clearly	  not	  the	  case	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  as	  military	  coups	  and	  interventions	  have	  happened	  fairly	  frequently	  throughout	  history.	  	  Why	  do	  militaries	  choose	  to	  intervene,	  and	  what	  societal	  pressures	  prompt	  them	  to	  follow	  this	  path?	  	  One	  major	  reason	  for	  intervention	  is	  the	  existence	  of	  inadequate	  or	  malfunctioning	  state	  institutions.16	  This	  could	  be	  manifested	  in	  a	  government	  that	  is	  unable	  to	  effectively	  rule,	  or	  a	  fractionalized	  society	  in	  which	  the	  state	  as	  an	  institution	  seems	  threatened	  by	  the	  extreme	  polarization	  of	  society.	  	  The	  other	  reason	  that	  militaries	  may	  choose	  to	  intervene	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Samuel Huntington, Reforming Civil Military Relations, 4.	  
14 David L. Shambaugh, "Civil-Military Relations," in Modernizing China's Military Progress, Problems, and 
Prospects. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 12. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Deborah L. Norden, "Democracy and the Armed Forces," in Military Rebellion in Argentina between Coups and 
Consolidation. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 13. 
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is	  to	  support	  a	  particular	  sector	  of	  society	  whose	  interests	  are	  threatened	  by	  the	  government	  that	  currently	  holds	  power.17	  These	  interest	  groups	  could	  emanate	  from	  within	  the	  armed	  forces	  themselves,	  or	  some	  outside	  group	  who	  manages	  to	  co-­‐opt	  the	  military’s	  support	  for	  their	  cause.	  	  	  
Both	  of	  these	  scenarios	  by	  themselves	  are	  not	  enough	  to	  spur	  the	  military’s	  entrance	  into	  the	  political	  sphere.	  	  As	  has	  already	  been	  noted,	  the	  level	  of	  professionalism	  within	  a	  military	  is	  key	  to	  its	  decision	  to	  intervene	  or	  not.	  	  However,	  the	  type	  of	  military	  professionalization	  is	  also	  fundamental	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  If	  a	  highly	  professional	  military’s	  definition	  of	  security	  includes	  adversaries	  of	  both	  foreign	  and	  domestic	  natures,	  the	  professional	  military	  may	  justify	  its	  intervention	  in	  the	  civilian	  sector	  as	  a	  way	  to	  protect	  the	  state	  against	  internal	  enemies.18	  	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century	  many	  Latin	  American	  militaries	  justified	  their	  intervention	  in	  the	  political	  sphere	  as	  a	  way	  to	  defend	  their	  countries	  against	  an	  internal	  communist	  or	  subversive	  threat.	  	  	  	  
How	  the	  military	  chooses	  to	  pursue	  its	  professional	  autonomy	  from	  civilian	  institutions	  is	  essential	  in	  determining	  whether	  a	  military	  is	  a	  threat	  to	  intervene	  or	  not.	  	  When	  militaries	  assume	  offensive	  attempts	  at	  obtaining	  autonomy,	  these	  attempts	  are	  politically	  guided	  in	  nature	  and	  are	  designed	  to	  limit	  the	  civilian	  government’s	  power	  and	  influence	  within	  the	  armed	  forces.	  	  Offensive	  attempts	  to	  secure	  autonomy	  often	  lead	  to	  situations	  of	  direct	  confrontation	  with	  the	  civilian	  government.19	  	  If	  the	  military	  pursues	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Deborah L. Norden, Democracy and the Armed Forces, 13. 
18 Ibid., 17.  
19 David Pion-Berlin, "Military Autonomy and Emerging Democracies in South America," Comparative Politics 
Vol. 25, No. 1 (1992): 85, http://www.jstor.org/stable/422098. 
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defensive	  attempts	  to	  guard	  their	  professional	  functions	  from	  unqualified	  outsiders,	  the	  result	  is	  generally	  an	  increased	  level	  of	  professionalization	  and	  modernization,	  which	  reduces	  the	  risk	  of	  military	  intervention.20	  	  Other	  societal	  and	  historical	  factors	  also	  remain	  important	  in	  understanding	  the	  motivations	  behind	  military	  intervention.	  	  Societies	  with	  greater	  political	  violence,	  histories	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  government,	  and	  military	  training	  from	  foreign	  governments	  suffer	  from	  increased	  chances	  of	  political	  participation	  by	  the	  armed	  forces.21	  	  On	  the	  contrary,	  countries	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  participation	  in	  civil	  society,	  high	  levels	  of	  economic	  development	  and	  industrialization,	  a	  strong	  middle	  class,	  and	  strong	  civilian	  political	  institutions	  have	  a	  lower	  probability	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  government.22	  
It	  seems	  obvious	  that	  societies	  in	  conflict	  have	  a	  higher	  chance	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  government,	  mainly	  due	  to	  the	  destabilizing	  nature	  of	  intra-­‐societal	  conflicts.	  	  But	  what	  makes	  societies	  more	  or	  less	  prone	  to	  conflict?	  	  The	  cross	  cutting	  ties	  theory	  of	  conflict	  believes	  that	  societies	  with	  more	  interaction	  among	  divided	  sectors	  of	  society	  are	  less	  prone	  to	  conflict	  than	  those	  with	  entrenched	  divisions	  that	  serve	  to	  reinforce	  each	  other.23	  	  For	  example,	  a	  society	  where	  there	  is	  reasonable	  access	  to	  education	  across	  economic	  classes,	  and	  where	  different	  classes	  of	  people	  are	  dispersed	  throughout	  the	  country,	  would	  be	  less	  prone	  to	  violent	  intra-­‐societal	  conflict	  than	  a	  state	  where	  all	  the	  poor	  live	  in	  rural	  areas	  with	  poor	  access	  to	  education,	  while	  the	  upper	  class	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 David Pion-Berlin, Military Autonomy, 85.	  
21	  Robert D. Putnam, "Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics," in Armies and Politics 
in Latin America. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1976), 90.  
22 Ibid., 89. 
23 Leslie F. Anderson, "Of Wild and Cultivated Politics: Conflict and Democracy in Argentina," International 
Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 2002: 101. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20020149.	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lives	  in	  urban	  localities	  and	  are	  highly	  educated.	  	  The	  developmental	  theory	  of	  conflict	  believes	  that	  the	  more	  developed	  state	  institutions	  are,	  the	  less	  prone	  to	  conflict	  a	  society	  is.	  	  Development	  in	  this	  theory	  is	  not	  defined	  as	  democracy,	  but	  rather	  as	  the	  relative	  strength	  of	  these	  institutions	  that	  explains	  the	  existence	  or	  lack	  of	  conflict	  within	  a	  society.24	  Many	  of	  these	  theories	  accurately	  describe	  many	  of	  the	  different	  situations	  present	  in	  Mexico	  and	  Argentina	  throughout	  their	  histories,	  and	  help	  to	  explain	  the	  differing	  relationships	  that	  each	  country	  has	  experienced	  between	  their	  armed	  forces	  and	  civilian	  governments.	  
	  
Argentina	  
In	  1815	  Simon	  Bolivar,	  leader	  of	  the	  South	  American	  wars	  of	  independence	  against	  Spain,	  predicted	  “en	  Buenos	  Aires	  habrá	  un	  gobierno	  central	  en	  que	  los	  militares	  se	  lleven	  la	  primacía	  por	  consecuencia	  de	  sus	  divisions	  intestinas	  y	  guerras	  externas.”25	  (In	  Buenos	  Aires	  there	  will	  be	  a	  central	  government	  lead	  by	  the	  military	  as	  a	  result	  of	  its	  internal	  divisions	  and	  external	  wars.)	  	  This	  prediction	  was	  startlingly	  accurate,	  and	  in	  many	  ways	  perfectly	  described	  what	  the	  Argentinean	  political	  system	  would	  experience	  until	  a	  stable	  democratic	  government	  finally	  emerged	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  1976	  military	  junta.	  	  Starting	  with	  the	  Juan	  Manuel	  de	  Rosas	  military	  dictatorship	  that	  began	  in	  1835,	  Argentina	  would	  experience	  a	  century	  and	  a	  half	  of	  political	  flux	  in	  which	  different	  political	  factions	  vied	  for	  power,	  and	  prevented	  the	  development	  of	  strong	  political	  institutions	  that	  were	  harmful	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Leslie F. Anderson, Of Wild and Cultivated Politics, 102. 
25 Simon Bolivar to Henry Cullen, “La Carta de Jamaica,” 1815, 
http://www.elhistoriador.com.ar/documentos/independencia/bolivar_carta_jamaica.php.	  
	   15	  
their	  own	  self-­‐serving	  interests.	  	  The	  dearth	  of	  these	  institutions	  encouraged	  the	  army,	  which	  had	  a	  strong	  tradition	  of	  intervention,	  to	  insert	  itself	  as	  a	  political	  actor	  that	  was	  willing	  to	  intervene	  anytime	  it	  felt	  that	  Argentinean	  society,	  or	  its	  own	  interests	  within	  society	  were	  threatened.	  The	  trajectory	  of	  Argentinean	  political	  history	  is	  key	  for	  understanding	  the	  inability	  of	  the	  Argentinean	  government	  to	  subordinate	  the	  military	  to	  civilian	  control,	  and	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  this	  section.	  
In	  the	  early	  1800’s	  Argentinean	  society	  was	  extremely	  divided	  politically,	  physically,	  and	  culturally.	  	  The	  population	  was	  separated	  between	  those	  who	  lived	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  and	  its	  surrounding	  area,	  and	  those	  who	  lived	  away	  from	  the	  city	  in	  the	  provinces.	  	  This	  geographic	  gap	  was	  also	  representative	  of	  a	  strong	  political	  divide	  between	  the	  Unitarians,	  who	  lived	  mainly	  in	  Buenos	  Aires	  and	  wanted	  to	  unify	  the	  nation	  under	  a	  strong	  central	  government,	  and	  the	  Federalists	  who	  lived	  primarily	  in	  the	  provinces	  and	  hoped	  for	  greater	  autonomy	  and	  independence	  for	  themselves.26	  	  These	  divisions	  were	  made	  worse	  by	  the	  strong	  cultural	  split	  between	  the	  higher	  educated	  Unitarians	  and	  the	  more	  rural	  Federalists	  who	  were	  often	  seen	  as	  “crude”	  by	  the	  Unitarians.27	  	  When	  Rosas	  took	  control	  of	  the	  country	  these	  conflicts	  were	  still	  prevalent	  in	  society,	  but	  rather	  than	  working	  them	  out	  through	  constructive	  political	  discourse,	  Rosas	  began	  a	  process	  of	  clandestine	  violence	  against	  his	  opponents,	  designed	  to	  force	  their	  views	  out	  of	  society.	  	  Violent	  bands	  of	  Federalists	  would	  roam	  the	  streets	  at	  night;	  murdering	  or	  imprisoning	  suspected	  Unitarians	  without	  any	  semblance	  of	  due	  process	  of	  law.28	  	  Though	  Rosas	  initially	  denied	  his	  government’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  violence,	  it	  quickly	  reached	  a	  level	  where	  denial	  was	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Leslie F. Anderson, Of Wild and Cultivated Politics, 104. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., 105.	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no	  longer	  possible.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  Rosas	  stopped	  feigning	  ignorance,	  and	  simply	  portrayed	  the	  violence	  as	  better	  than	  any	  alternative,	  normalizing	  the	  idea	  that	  clandestine	  violence	  could	  be	  used	  as	  a	  viable	  political	  tool.29	  	  	  
Rosas	  ruled	  by	  violent	  force,	  and	  through	  the	  strength	  of	  his	  character	  alone.	  	  The	  stability	  of	  his	  government	  was	  entirely	  dependent	  on	  its	  leader’s	  personal	  political	  strength,	  which	  prevented	  the	  formation	  of	  any	  strong	  political	  institutions.	  	  This	  type	  of	  personalistic	  rule	  would	  be	  copied	  in	  subsequent	  governments,	  even	  after	  a	  democratic	  system	  had	  been	  established.	  	  The	  Saez	  Peña	  voting	  law	  of	  1912	  made	  universal	  male	  suffrage	  legal,	  and	  allowed	  for	  the	  election	  of	  Hipólito	  Yrigoyen	  from	  1916-­‐1922	  and	  1928-­‐1930.30	  Yrigoyen	  used	  his	  popular	  support	  and	  electoral	  victory	  to	  govern	  in	  a	  near	  authoritarian	  manner,	  negating	  the	  purpose	  of	  any	  established	  political	  or	  governmental	  systems.31	  	  The	  strength	  of	  his	  government	  was	  not	  based	  on	  the	  support	  of	  any	  party,	  but	  was	  based	  in	  the	  following	  he	  was	  able	  to	  cultivate	  due	  to	  his	  personal	  strength	  as	  a	  leader	  and	  ruler.	  	  His	  government’s	  authority	  to	  rule	  was	  not	  grounded	  in	  any	  government	  institutions.	  	  As	  Yrigoyen’s	  word	  was	  law,	  there	  was	  no	  need	  for	  a	  strong	  system	  of	  government	  to	  legitimize	  his	  policies.	  	  This	  personalistic	  system	  of	  rule	  extended	  to	  his	  attempts	  to	  subordinate	  the	  military	  as	  he	  promoted	  officers	  based	  on	  personal	  ties	  and	  affiliations	  rather	  than	  for	  professional	  reasons.32	  	  This	  undermined	  the	  value	  of	  military	  professionalism	  and	  encouraged	  and	  standardized	  the	  participation	  of	  officers	  in	  politics,	  even	  if	  it	  was	  not	  direct	  participation.	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  Leslie	  F.	  Anderson,	  Of	  Wild	  and	  Cultivated	  Politics,	  107.	  
30	  Deborah L. Norden, "The Political Roles of the Argentine Military: A Historical Overview," in Military Rebellion 
in Argentina between Coups and Consolidation. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 22. 
31	  Leslie	  F.	  Anderson,	  Of	  Wild	  and	  Cultivated	  Politics,	  112.	  
32Deborah L. Norden, The Political Roles of the Argentine Military, 22.	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The	  growing	  power	  of	  the	  US	  as	  the	  world’s	  principal	  exporter	  during	  and	  after	  WWI,	  and	  the	  ensuing	  depression	  that	  blindsided	  the	  world	  led	  most	  countries	  to	  pursue	  protectionist	  economic	  strategies.	  	  Argentina	  found	  itself	  unable	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  global	  marketplace,	  and	  Yrigoyen	  found	  his	  government	  losing	  support	  and	  legitimacy	  quickly.33	  As	  Yrigoyen’s	  government	  was	  based	  solely	  in	  the	  political	  strength	  and	  figure	  of	  Yrigoyen	  himself,	  no	  reliable	  political	  institutions	  or	  parties	  existed	  for	  the	  public,	  and	  specifically	  the	  ever-­‐restless	  Argentinean	  oligarchy,	  to	  express	  their	  discontent	  with	  Yrigoyen’s	  government	  or	  to	  challenge	  his	  rule	  in	  a	  legitimate	  fashion.	  	  With	  no	  viable	  means	  to	  create	  an	  opposition	  to	  Yrigoyen’s	  rule,	  his	  government	  and	  his	  ideology	  were	  thrown	  out	  of	  power	  in	  1930	  by	  a	  military	  coup	  led	  by	  General	  Uriburu,	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  Argentinean	  oligarchy,	  which	  that	  would	  set	  the	  precedent	  for	  military	  intervention	  in	  government	  for	  the	  next	  50	  years.34	  
	   From	  1930	  until	  1943,	  various	  illegitimate	  governments	  representing	  the	  will	  of	  the	  conservative	  elite	  came	  to	  power	  through	  fraudulent	  electoral	  practices.	  	  No	  strong	  political	  parties	  or	  forum	  for	  true	  political	  discourse	  and	  change	  arose	  during	  this	  time	  period	  leaving	  a	  power	  gap	  as	  soon	  as	  each	  government	  failed	  or	  lost	  legitimacy.	  	  This	  period	  came	  to	  be	  known	  as	  the	  infamous	  decade	  due	  to	  the	  rampant	  corruption,	  and	  bad	  policies	  of	  the	  governments.	  	  In	  1943,	  a	  military	  coup	  removed	  Ramón	  Castillo	  from	  government	  and	  a	  group	  of	  military	  leaders	  took	  control,	  hoping	  to	  fix	  the	  ailing	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  Joseph S. Tulchin, "The Origins of Misunderstanding: United States- Argentine Relations," in Argentina Between 
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Argentinean	  society.35	  	  Among	  the	  military	  leaders	  who	  took	  control	  was	  General	  Juan	  Domingo	  Perón,	  who	  in	  a	  short	  time	  would	  consolidate	  his	  power	  and	  become	  the	  best-­‐known	  and	  most	  polarizing	  figure	  of	  Argentinean	  politics	  even	  to	  this	  day.	  
The	  military	  coup	  that	  brought	  Perón	  to	  power	  was	  led	  by	  a	  coalition	  of	  various	  factions	  within	  the	  armed	  forces,	  the	  most	  powerful	  of	  which	  was	  the	  Grupo	  de	  Oficiales	  Unidos	  (GOU)	  who	  were	  controlled	  by	  Perón	  himself.	  	  The	  principal	  motivations	  for	  the	  coup	  were	  to	  guard	  Argentina	  against	  communism,	  a	  fear	  of	  involvement	  in	  WWII,	  and,	  ironically,	  a	  resentment	  of	  the	  intrusion	  of	  the	  Army	  into	  politics.36	  	  Privately	  members	  of	  the	  GOU	  also	  expressed	  concerns	  with	  a	  need	  for	  social	  justice	  and	  wealth	  redistribution	  reform	  efforts,	  though	  these	  beliefs	  were	  not	  representative	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  as	  a	  whole.37	  	  As	  one	  of	  the	  principal	  leaders	  of	  the	  coup,	  Perón	  also	  used	  his	  position	  as	  the	  head	  of	  the	  National	  Labor	  Department	  to	  mobilize	  the	  urban	  working	  class,	  and	  force	  the	  labor	  unions	  to	  be	  loyal	  to	  him	  as	  a	  political	  figure	  and	  ally.38	  	  In	  1946	  he	  was	  elected	  to	  the	  presidency	  with	  54	  percent	  of	  the	  vote,	  mainly	  due	  to	  his	  promises	  of	  an	  improved	  future	  for	  the	  Argentinean	  working	  class,	  and	  his	  perceived	  ability	  to	  actually	  follow	  through	  on	  these	  promises	  during	  the	  short	  time	  he	  had	  been	  head	  of	  the	  Labor	  Department.	  
As	  President,	  Perón	  used	  and	  cultivated	  his	  figure	  as	  the	  workingman's	  leader	  that	  had	  brought	  him	  to	  the	  presidency.	  	  Along	  with	  his	  beautiful	  wife	  Eva,	  he	  delivered	  speeches	  to	  massive	  crowds	  of	  screaming	  Argentinean	  workers,	  using	  populist	  rhetoric	  to	  mobilize	  the	  masses	  in	  support	  for	  his	  programs.	  	  Peronism	  had	  many	  early	  successes	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improving	  conditions	  for	  workers,	  which	  bolstered	  Perón's	  cult	  of	  personality,	  and	  allowed	  him	  to	  consolidate	  his	  power	  with	  support	  from	  the	  masses.39	  	  While	  Perón's	  social	  and	  economic	  policies	  felt	  threatening	  to	  many	  sectors	  of	  society,	  it	  was	  his	  consolidation	  of	  power	  that	  was	  most	  damaging	  for	  Argentina's	  future.	  	  Many	  anti-­‐peronist	  opposition	  parties	  accused	  Perón	  of	  forming,	  or	  attempting	  to	  form,	  a	  totalitarian	  government	  under	  the	  guise	  of	  a	  liberal	  democratic	  one	  with	  huge	  popular	  support.	  	  In	  reality,	  Perón's	  government	  never	  became	  totalitarian	  in	  the	  way	  that	  its	  opposition	  claimed,	  though	  there	  was	  significant	  censorship	  and	  repression	  of	  opposition	  movements	  and	  groups.40	  	  As	  Perón's	  power	  and	  influence	  grew,	  not	  even	  his	  beloved	  unions	  were	  immune	  to	  repression	  if	  they	  refused	  to	  fall	  in	  line	  with	  his	  mandates.	  	  Opposition	  parties	  never	  grew	  strong	  due	  to	  internal	  fractionalization,	  in	  addition	  to	  this	  repression	  and	  censorship	  from	  the	  Peronist	  government.	  	  	  Perón	  used	  his	  immense	  popular	  support	  as	  legitimation	  for	  his	  policies	  and	  for	  further	  consolidation	  of	  power,	  rather	  than	  to	  form	  an	  institutionally	  strong	  government,	  the	  strength	  of	  whose	  institutions	  could	  have	  legitimized	  Peronism	  outside	  of	  Perón’s	  personal	  power	  and	  influence.	  
As	  Perón	  further	  developed	  and	  strengthened	  his	  cult	  of	  personality	  and	  slowly	  removed	  his	  opposition	  from	  the	  official	  political	  spheres,	  he	  was	  paving	  the	  way	  for	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  force	  their	  way	  back	  into	  the	  Argentinean	  political	  scene.	  	  Through	  censorship,	  Perón	  negated	  opposition	  parties	  the	  ability	  to	  compete	  effectively	  in	  the	  electoral	  system,	  and	  forced	  members	  of	  the	  opposition	  to	  express	  their	  discontent	  through	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different	  means,	  creating	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  it	  seemed	  as	  though	  Peronism	  would	  remain	  the	  dominant	  political	  philosophy	  with	  Perón	  as	  its	  leader	  without	  challenge	  or	  debate	  unless	  someone	  could	  impose	  a	  switch.	  	  Through	  his	  cultivation	  of	  a	  populist	  political	  movement,	  Perón	  tied	  the	  success	  of	  his	  government	  directly	  to	  himself	  and	  never	  allowed	  or	  needed	  a	  set	  of	  strong	  governmental	  institutions	  to	  support	  his	  policies.	  	  Thus	  the	  successes	  and	  failures	  of	  Peronism	  were	  tied	  directly	  to	  Perón	  himself,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  opportunity	  for	  legitimate	  political	  turnover	  or	  change	  even	  within	  the	  Peronist	  party.	  	  The	  lack	  of	  a	  legitimate	  avenue	  to	  support	  political	  turnover	  strengthened	  the	  divisions	  within	  Argentina,	  and	  as	  the	  economy	  under	  Perón’s	  government	  began	  to	  struggle,	  the	  anti-­‐peronist	  factions	  organized	  a	  way	  outside	  of	  the	  legal	  political	  spheres	  to	  express	  their	  discontent.	  
The	  1955	  coup	  that	  overthrew	  Perón	  contradictorily	  cited	  a	  wish	  to	  return	  to	  the	  “republican	  way	  of	  life”	  that	  they	  felt	  Perón	  had	  forsaken.41	  	  It	  was	  supported	  by	  a	  long-­‐standing	  tradition	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  government	  as	  a	  legitimate	  method	  for	  expressing	  discontent	  with	  those	  in	  power,	  and	  a	  fear	  of	  Perón’s	  ever	  growing	  power	  and	  influence.	  	  The	  new	  military	  government	  excluded	  Peronist	  parties	  from	  all	  future	  elections,	  and	  looked	  to	  fix	  the	  failing	  economy	  through	  controlling	  inflation	  and	  increasing	  exports.42	  	  However,	  their	  attempts	  were	  largely	  unsuccessful,	  and	  in	  1958,	  elections	  were	  held	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  without	  a	  Peronist	  candidate	  on	  the	  ballot.	  	  Despite	  his	  prescription	  from	  the	  election,	  Perón	  supposedly	  made	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  candidate	  Arturo	  Frondizi	  to	  continue	  some	  Peronist	  policies	  in	  return	  for	  Perón’s	  electoral	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support,	  which	  brought	  Frondizi’s	  to	  victory.43	  	  This	  not	  only	  hurt	  Frondizi	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  armed	  forces,	  but	  made	  it	  nearly	  impossible	  for	  Argentina	  to	  move	  towards	  developing	  any	  sort	  of	  strong	  political	  institutions	  outside	  the	  personalist	  influence	  of	  Perón.	  	  Frondizi’s	  government	  did	  not	  fare	  much	  better	  than	  its	  predecessors.	  	  He	  was	  largely	  conciliatory	  in	  his	  stance	  towards	  the	  armed	  forces,	  granting	  any	  wishes	  they	  had	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  coup	  presented	  itself.44	  	  
This	  threat	  finally	  manifested	  itself	  after	  Frondizi	  allowed	  the	  Peronists	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  1962	  election	  and	  win	  despite	  the	  absence	  of	  Perón.	  	  Frondizi	  was	  replaced	  by	  the	  military	  with	  Arturo	  Illia,	  who	  attempted	  to	  create	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  separation	  of	  politics	  and	  the	  military	  by	  accepting	  the	  leadership	  of	  General	  Onganía	  as	  commander	  of	  the	  armed	  forces,	  and	  allowing	  for	  autonomy	  in	  military	  promotions,	  removing	  civilian	  politics	  from	  the	  equation.45	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  this	  would	  have	  begun	  the	  process	  of	  professionalization	  and	  subordination	  of	  the	  military	  became	  irrelevant	  as	  the	  economy	  began	  to	  lag,	  and	  Illia’s	  support	  in	  the	  military	  dropped	  considerably.	  	  When	  Illia	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  allow	  Peronism	  to	  compete	  in	  the	  upcoming	  elections	  he	  was	  removed	  from	  power	  and	  replaced	  with	  a	  military	  government	  headed	  by	  General	  Onganía.46	  	  As	  with	  Frondizi,	  Illia	  never	  had	  a	  chance	  to	  establish	  any	  sort	  of	  meaningful	  political	  institutions,	  largely	  because	  of	  the	  constant	  threat	  of	  a	  military	  coup	  to	  his	  government.	  	  The	  public’s	  continued	  support	  for	  Perón	  never	  made	  the	  army	  feel	  comfortable	  enough	  to	  remove	  itself	  from	  the	  political	  sphere,	  and	  certainly	  not	  to	  allow	  Peronism	  to	  become	  a	  legitimate	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opposition	  party	  to	  the	  civilian	  governments	  they	  had	  installed.	  	  The	  weak	  political	  institutions	  and	  lack	  of	  a	  legal	  Peronist	  party	  meant	  that	  each	  democratic	  government’s	  legitimacy	  and	  authority	  was	  severely	  limited,	  and	  thus	  the	  military	  was	  forced	  to	  remain	  a	  political	  actor	  in	  order	  to	  legitimize	  and	  help	  with	  the	  functioning	  of	  these	  governments.	  	  The	  military	  saw	  itself	  as	  the	  glue	  that	  held	  society	  together	  and	  protected	  it	  from	  dangers,	  and	  this	  vision	  prevented	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  set	  of	  institutions	  that	  could	  have	  removed	  the	  military	  from	  this	  role.	  
The	  1966	  coup	  that	  dispatched	  Illia’s	  government	  was	  further	  reaching	  than	  the	  decade’s	  earlier	  coups.	  	  At	  this	  point,	  Argentinean	  society	  had	  become	  so	  desensitized	  to	  military	  intervention	  in	  the	  political	  system	  that	  many	  people	  actually	  supported	  the	  coup	  in	  the	  hopes	  that	  the	  military	  could	  help	  stop	  the	  growing	  social	  disorder	  and	  get	  the	  country	  back	  on	  the	  right	  path.47	  	  Unlike	  earlier	  coups,	  this	  intervention	  was	  led	  by	  the	  joint	  high	  command	  from	  all	  three	  branches	  of	  the	  military.	  	  More	  importantly,	  its	  aim	  was	  not	  temporary,	  the	  junta	  wanted	  to	  permanently	  transform	  Argentinean	  state	  and	  society	  by	  instituting	  new	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  structures.48	  	  The	  junta	  instituted	  a	  vertical	  militarized	  state	  based	  on	  the	  national	  security	  doctrine,	  which	  considered	  the	  principal	  threat	  to	  Argentina’s	  security	  to	  be	  from	  an	  internal	  enemy.	  	  Accordingly,	  all	  political	  parties,	  not	  just	  Peronism,	  were	  banned	  under	  the	  new	  government,	  various	  state	  monitoring	  systems	  were	  set	  up	  to	  watch	  over	  the	  Argentinean	  population,	  and	  the	  junta	  dramatically	  reformed	  Argentina’s	  civil,	  criminal,	  and	  commercial	  codes,	  the	  first	  time	  a	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military	  government	  had	  directly	  interfered	  with	  these	  statutes.49	  	  Left	  with	  no	  legitimate	  legal	  way	  to	  protest	  the	  government	  and	  supported	  by	  an	  exiled	  Perón,	  radical	  left-­‐wing	  Peronist	  ideologies	  emerged,	  with	  groups	  such	  as	  the	  “Montoneros”	  and	  the	  “ERP”	  waging	  guerrilla	  terrorist	  wars	  against	  the	  military	  government.50	  	  This	  political	  violence,	  which	  was	  reciprocated	  towards	  the	  guerrillas	  by	  the	  military	  government,	  culminated	  in	  the	  kidnapping	  and	  murder	  of	  General	  Aramburu	  in	  1969	  by	  the	  Montoneros,	  which	  exhibited	  how	  polarized	  and	  unstable	  Argentina	  was	  under	  the	  military	  junta.51	  
	   By	  this	  point	  in	  Argentinean	  history,	  the	  main	  fear	  of	  the	  ruling	  military	  leaders	  was	  no	  longer	  Peronism,	  but	  rather	  communism	  and	  internal	  subversion	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  destabilize	  society	  and	  disrupt	  the	  established	  social	  order.52	  	  As	  the	  economic	  situation	  began	  to	  worsen,	  the	  military	  government	  started	  to	  lose	  the	  legitimacy	  it	  had	  possessed.	  	  During	  the	  military’s	  tenure	  of	  government	  no	  strong	  governmental	  or	  political	  institutions	  ever	  had	  the	  chance	  to	  develop	  due	  to	  the	  prescription	  of	  all	  political	  parties	  and	  the	  military’s	  ability	  to	  enforce	  its	  laws	  without	  any	  sort	  of	  institutional	  support.	  	  Argentinean	  society	  was	  the	  most	  polarized	  it	  had	  ever	  been,	  and	  political	  violence	  was	  constantly	  threatening	  to	  destabilize	  the	  military	  government’s	  capacity	  to	  control	  society.	  	  With	  practically	  no	  strong	  institutions	  in	  existence,	  the	  only	  viable	  option	  for	  a	  military	  trying	  to	  remove	  itself	  from	  a	  worsening	  situation	  before	  it	  lost	  all	  legitimacy	  was	  to	  allow	  for	  the	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return	  of	  a	  man	  who’s	  figure	  alone	  had	  enough	  political	  capital	  and	  support	  within	  society	  to	  potentially	  calm	  the	  skyrocketing	  tensions	  and	  restore	  order.53	  
	   Perón	  returned	  to	  a	  nearly	  impossible	  situation	  in	  Argentina.	  	  Things	  were	  so	  bad	  that	  when	  Perón	  landed	  in	  Ezeiza	  airport	  in	  Buenos	  Aires,	  a	  day	  that	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  filled	  with	  joy	  over	  the	  return	  of	  the	  long	  exiled	  leader,	  the	  radical	  Peronist	  right	  began	  firing	  indiscriminately	  at	  the	  gathered	  crowd	  over	  fears	  that	  disturbances	  would	  be	  created	  by	  the	  radical	  left,	  resulting	  in	  30	  deaths	  and	  over	  300	  injuries.54	  	  Perón’s	  once	  stable	  base	  headed	  by	  his	  authority	  as	  a	  populist	  leader	  was	  severely	  fractionalized	  with	  strong	  sectors	  on	  both	  the	  radical	  left	  and	  the	  radical	  right,	  both	  of	  which	  used	  Perón’s	  personalist	  discourse	  for	  their	  own	  goals.55	  	  One	  of	  the	  conditions	  the	  military	  government	  insisted	  on	  before	  allowing	  Perón’s	  return	  was	  a	  condemnation	  and	  withdrawal	  of	  support	  from	  all	  guerilla	  forces	  and	  factions.	  	  The	  military	  also	  required	  that	  the	  new	  government	  be	  prepared	  to	  actively	  fight	  subversion,	  which	  they	  saw	  as	  existing	  most	  strongly	  in	  the	  radical	  Peronist	  left,	  or	  risk	  another	  intervention.56	  	  But	  Perón	  needed	  the	  support	  of	  the	  left	  leaning	  Peronist	  sectors	  to	  be	  able	  to	  govern,	  and	  thus	  he	  was	  forced	  to	  find	  a	  delicate	  balance	  between	  condemning	  the	  violent	  actions	  of	  the	  radical	  left	  groups	  without	  alienating	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  Peronist	  left.57	  	  	  
Perón	  was	  caught	  in	  the	  middle,	  hanging	  on	  solely	  through	  his	  status	  as	  a	  political	  icon	  and	  the	  legitimacy	  that	  it	  gave	  him.	  	  No	  strong	  party	  structure	  existed	  to	  help	  reconcile	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the	  two	  competing	  Peronist	  factions,	  and	  no	  opposition	  party	  was	  able	  to	  emerge	  as	  a	  viable	  alternative.	  	  Nothing	  represented	  this	  fact	  better	  than	  Perón’s	  selection	  of	  his	  new	  wife	  Isabel	  Perón	  as	  his	  vice	  president,	  who’s	  only	  source	  of	  political	  experience	  and	  legitimacy	  was	  her	  shared	  last	  name.	  	  Perón’s	  unexpected	  death	  in	  1974	  left	  a	  completely	  inexperienced	  person	  in	  control	  of	  a	  violently	  polarized	  society	  with	  practically	  no	  support	  from	  any	  stable	  political	  or	  governmental	  institution.	  	  Unlike	  Perón’s	  first	  wife,	  Eva,	  Isabel	  also	  did	  not	  possess	  the	  cult	  following	  that	  had	  practically	  deified	  the	  original	  first	  lady,	  and	  thus	  was	  left	  with	  nothing	  other	  than	  her	  last	  name	  to	  lend	  legitimacy	  to	  her	  government	  and	  try	  to	  repair	  the	  Argentine	  system	  that	  seemed	  to	  be	  circling	  closer	  and	  closer	  to	  the	  drain.	  
	   Unfortunately	  Isabel	  Perón	  was	  unable	  to	  produce	  the	  miracle	  necessary	  to	  save	  Argentina	  from	  devolving	  into	  near	  anarchy	  and	  eventually	  regressing	  to	  military	  rule.	  	  While	  her	  government	  did	  not	  perform	  well	  economically,	  and	  did	  practically	  nothing	  to	  begin	  subordinating	  the	  military	  to	  civilian	  control	  or	  to	  form	  the	  strong	  institutions	  that	  would	  have	  been	  necessary	  to	  help	  facilitate	  this	  transition,	  her	  greatest	  failure	  was	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Triple	  A,	  an	  organization	  headed	  by	  her	  principal	  advisor	  José	  López	  Rega	  that	  began	  a	  program	  of	  clandestine	  violence	  against	  the	  far	  left	  radicals	  in	  Argentina.	  	  This	  decision	  had	  two	  major	  consequences;	  it	  escalated	  and	  normalized	  clandestine	  violence	  within	  Argentinean	  society,	  and	  threatened	  the	  armed	  forces	  monopoly	  over	  the	  legitimate	  use	  of	  violence	  in	  the	  state,	  which	  were	  fearful	  of	  an	  armed	  Peronist	  group	  with	  firepower	  to	  match	  their	  own	  and	  the	  backing	  of	  a	  (somewhat)	  legitimate	  democratic	  government.58	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However,	  the	  armed	  forces	  did	  not	  immediately	  intervene	  in	  the	  hopes	  of	  another	  quick	  fix	  junta.	  	  Rather	  they	  waited	  until	  the	  Peronist	  government	  was	  completely	  discredited	  in	  society’s	  mind	  by	  the	  rising	  anarchy	  before	  initiating	  their	  coup.59	  
	   This	  coup	  was	  different	  from	  previous	  military	  takeovers	  as	  it	  was	  carefully	  organized	  and	  instigated	  by	  leaders	  of	  all	  three	  branches	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  rather	  than	  just	  one	  disgruntled	  faction.60	  Additionally,	  it	  was	  legitimized	  by	  the	  total	  lack	  of	  control	  of	  Isabel	  Perón’s	  government,	  and	  was	  supported	  by	  powerful	  social	  forces,	  political	  actors,	  and	  foreign	  interests.61	  	  A	  few	  words	  should	  be	  said	  about	  the	  foreign	  interests	  that	  supported	  the	  coup,	  as	  they	  will	  prove	  useful	  in	  our	  comparative	  analysis	  later.	  
	   With	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  US	  instituted	  its	  strategy	  of	  containment,	  which	  tried	  to	  limit	  the	  spread	  of	  communism	  throughout	  the	  world,	  but	  especially	  to	  its	  neighbors	  in	  Latin	  America.	  	  The	  fear	  of	  communism	  in	  Latin	  America	  grew	  tremendously	  after	  Cuba	  fell	  under	  communist	  rule	  in	  1959.	  	  Definitive	  links	  have	  been	  made	  between	  US	  government	  organizations,	  especially	  the	  CIA,	  and	  various	  military	  coups	  and	  governments	  throughout	  Latin	  America	  during	  this	  time	  period.	  	  While	  the	  US	  did	  not	  play	  as	  direct	  a	  role	  in	  Argentina	  as	  it	  did	  in	  Chile	  or	  Nicaragua,	  there	  are	  some	  concrete	  links	  that	  show	  the	  US	  was	  ok	  with	  the	  dissolution	  of	  democracy	  in	  Argentina,	  and	  likely	  supported	  some	  of	  the	  clandestine	  violence	  methods	  used	  against	  the	  Argentinean	  population.	  	  The	  Gerald	  Ford	  administration,	  with	  Henry	  Kissinger	  serving	  as	  secretary	  of	  state,	  had	  long	  been	  mistrustful	  of	  Peronism	  and	  its	  followers.	  	  Seeing	  Peronism	  as	  reminiscent	  of	  communism,	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the	  US	  had	  no	  problems	  with	  a	  military	  intervention	  in	  government	  as	  long	  as	  the	  illegal	  government’s	  policies	  aligned	  with	  US	  anti-­‐communist	  missions.	  62	  It	  is	  also	  known	  that	  Argentinean	  military	  members	  received	  training	  at	  the	  infamous	  School	  of	  the	  Americas,	  which	  is	  best	  known	  for	  teaching	  its	  graduates	  methods	  of	  torture	  as	  ways	  to	  combat	  subversive,	  communist	  threats	  within	  society.63	  	  	  
With	  the	  radicalization	  of	  the	  Peronist	  left,	  Argentinean	  society	  was	  perfect	  for	  the	  utilization	  of	  these	  methods,	  and	  many	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Triple	  A	  used	  techniques	  they	  had	  learned	  from	  US	  officials,	  or	  people	  trained	  by	  them.	  	  But	  these	  counter	  subversive	  methods	  were	  by	  their	  nature,	  best	  carried	  out	  by	  an	  authoritarian,	  military	  regime	  that	  would	  already	  have	  the	  structure,	  capacity,	  training,	  and	  willingness	  to	  carry	  out	  these	  acts.	  	  Though	  it	  is	  unconfirmed,	  it	  is	  believed	  that	  Kissinger	  likely	  gave	  explicit	  approval	  for	  the	  military	  coup,	  and	  possibly	  approved	  the	  counter	  subversive	  processo	  that	  followed.64	  If	  Kissinger	  himself	  did	  not	  explicitly	  approve	  the	  coup,	  there	  were	  certainly	  powerful	  US	  officials	  who	  knew	  of	  the	  coup	  and	  did	  nothing	  to	  prevent	  it	  before	  it	  actually	  happened.	  	  The	  US	  did	  not	  preoccupy	  itself	  with	  the	  atrocities	  being	  committed	  in	  Argentina	  until	  the	  Carter	  administration,	  though	  Regan’s	  administration	  largely	  regressed	  to	  the	  old	  policy	  of	  feigned	  ignorance,	  and	  even	  secured	  Argentinean	  assistance	  in	  training	  the	  Nicaraguan	  contras,	  and	  other	  repressive	  Central	  American	  military	  forces.65	  	  American	  policy,	  though	  totally	  unacceptable	  from	  the	  country	  that	  was	  supposed	  to	  be	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  free	  world,	  was	  entirely	  a	  reaction	  based	  in	  a	  lack	  of	  confidence	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  Argentinean	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government	  and	  political	  institutions.	  	  Despite	  its	  socialist	  leanings,	  the	  US	  would	  never	  have	  supported	  the	  overthrow	  of	  a	  democratically	  elected	  and	  stable	  Peronist	  government	  if	  the	  Peronists	  had	  a	  strong	  control	  over	  their	  country,	  and	  if	  stable	  political	  institutions	  had	  existed	  to	  keep	  them	  there.	  	  
This	  final	  military	  junta	  would	  last	  from	  1976-­‐1983,	  disappearing	  and	  murdering	  approximately	  30,000	  Argentinean	  citizens	  without	  any	  legal	  processes.	  	  As	  the	  economy	  struggled	  throughout	  the	  military’s	  rule,	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  junta	  eventually	  made	  the	  terrible	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  war	  against	  Britain	  over	  control	  of	  the	  Malvinas	  Islands	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  galvanize	  support	  for	  and	  relegitimze	  their	  government	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  public.66	  	  This	  awful	  choice	  was	  made	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  the	  US	  would	  for	  some	  reason	  support	  Argentina	  over	  the	  UK,	  America’s	  largest	  ally	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  communism,	  and	  with	  a	  severe	  overestimation	  of	  Argentina’s	  military	  capacity.	  	  The	  war	  was	  a	  slaughter,	  and	  when	  coupled	  with	  the	  terrible	  economic	  policies	  of	  the	  junta,	  and	  the	  growing	  awareness	  of	  the	  human	  rights	  violations	  committed	  under	  their	  government,	  any	  remaining	  legitimacy	  that	  the	  military	  possessed	  was	  lost,	  necessitating	  the	  return	  to	  democracy.67	  	  Argentina	  faced	  an	  uphill	  battle	  due	  to	  its	  long	  history	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  government,	  the	  extreme	  political	  violence	  that	  had	  occurred	  under	  the	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junta,	  and	  the	  desire	  for	  justice	  among	  the	  Argentinean	  people	  for	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  atrocities.68	  	  	  
However,	  the	  Argentinean	  military	  was	  weak	  and	  fractionalized	  internally	  and	  the	  new	  government	  had	  been	  elected	  on	  a	  platform	  of	  subordinating	  the	  military	  to	  civilian	  control	  and	  obtaining	  justice	  for	  the	  murdered	  Argentineans.69	  	  Internal	  divisions	  within	  the	  armed	  forces	  were	  strong	  between	  branches	  of	  the	  military,	  but	  also	  existed	  between	  senior	  and	  junior	  officers	  over	  the	  war	  in	  the	  Malvinas,	  which	  made	  it	  impossible	  for	  the	  military	  to	  resist	  the	  democratization	  occurring,	  or	  reinsert	  themselves	  into	  political	  society.	  	  The	  only	  unifying	  factor	  for	  the	  armed	  forces	  was	  in	  their	  commitment	  against	  prosecution	  for	  human	  rights	  abuses	  perpetrated	  during	  the	  junta.70	  	  The	  electoral	  victory	  of	  Raúl	  Alfonsín	  against	  his	  Peronist	  opponent	  was	  actually	  a	  surprise	  due	  to	  the	  radical	  nature	  of	  his	  campaign	  rhetoric	  over	  subordinating	  the	  military	  and	  obtaining	  justice.	  	  Had	  Alfonsín	  achieved	  or	  tried	  to	  follow	  through	  on	  all	  of	  his	  campaign	  promises,	  the	  armed	  forces	  likely	  would	  have	  set	  aside	  their	  differences	  and	  reentered	  the	  civilian	  sphere.71	  	  Thus,	  Alfonsín	  wisely	  focused	  his	  efforts	  on	  establishing	  civilian	  control	  over	  the	  military,	  slashing	  the	  military	  budget	  in	  half	  within	  the	  first	  two	  years	  of	  his	  presidency,	  and	  deciding	  to	  punish	  only	  the	  military	  members	  who	  had	  actually	  ordered	  others	  to	  commit	  human	  rights	  violations,	  in	  addition	  to	  allowing	  the	  military	  to	  self	  identify	  and	  prosecute	  these	  perpetrators.72	  	  Unfortunately,	  Alfonsín	  misjudged	  the	  number	  of	  officers	  directly	  involved	  in	  the	  processo,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Argentinean	  public’s	  willingness	  to	  accept	  any	  form	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of	  limited	  justice.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  Argentinean	  people	  began	  going	  through	  the	  civil	  justice	  system	  to	  obtain	  their	  personal	  justice,	  which	  threatened	  the	  already	  nervous	  armed	  forces	  and	  forced	  Alfonsín	  to	  enact	  the	  extremely	  unpopular	  “full-­‐stop”	  law,	  which	  placed	  a	  time	  limit	  on	  future	  prosecutions	  of	  the	  perpetrators.73	  
The	  passage	  of	  this	  law	  did	  not	  have	  the	  desired	  effect	  of	  calming	  the	  armed	  forces.	  	  Rather	  it	  led	  to	  a	  military	  revolt	  in	  1987,	  which	  was	  stopped	  by	  Alfonsín	  conceding	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  military	  to	  halt	  all	  prosecutions,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  outpouring	  of	  support	  from	  civil	  society	  groups	  such	  as	  human	  rights	  organizations	  and	  labor	  unions	  for	  Alfonsín’s	  government.74	  	  Subsequent	  revolts	  in	  1988	  and	  1989,	  allowed	  the	  military	  to	  re-­‐expand	  some	  of	  its	  societal	  influence	  that	  had	  been	  lost	  in	  the	  initial	  years	  of	  democracy.	  	  However,	  when	  Carlos	  Menem	  assumed	  the	  presidency	  in	  1989,	  he	  offered	  amnesty	  in	  exchange	  for	  obedience	  to	  civilian	  control,	  thus	  gaining	  the	  confidence	  of	  important	  officers,	  and	  re-­‐dividing	  the	  military	  internally	  whose	  only	  common	  ground	  had	  been	  fear	  of	  prosecution.75	  	  When	  a	  group	  of	  disgruntled	  officers	  rebelled	  in	  1990,	  Menem	  received	  support	  from	  other	  sections	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  defend	  his	  civilian	  government,	  the	  first	  time	  this	  had	  happened	  in	  the	  new	  democracy.	  	  The	  support	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  for	  Menem	  consolidated	  the	  civilian	  control	  over	  the	  armed	  forces,	  and	  allowed	  the	  President	  to	  reorganize	  the	  structure	  and	  mission	  of	  the	  military	  thus	  making	  it	  far	  less	  threatening	  as	  an	  institution	  to	  the	  Argentinean	  government.76	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Argentina’s	  subordination	  of	  the	  military	  after	  the	  final	  military	  junta	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  military’s	  complete	  lack	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  support	  among	  the	  Argentinean	  population,	  which	  proclaimed	  that	  never	  again	  would	  a	  military	  government	  be	  acceptable.	  	  This	  attitude	  gave	  the	  new	  government	  legitimacy	  in	  its	  efforts	  to	  subordinate	  and	  discipline	  the	  military	  for	  its	  actions.	  	  Though	  many	  Argentineans	  were	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  amount	  of	  justice	  handed	  down	  to	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  genocide,	  certainly	  no	  one	  would	  have	  taken	  a	  return	  to	  military	  rule	  over	  the	  eventual	  consolidation	  of	  civilian	  power	  over	  the	  armed	  forces.	  	  It	  is	  tragic	  that	  the	  murder	  of	  30,000	  civilians	  was	  required	  for	  Argentina	  to	  successfully	  create	  a	  society	  in	  which	  military	  intrusion	  into	  the	  civilian	  political	  sphere	  became	  unacceptable.	  	  Argentina	  was	  unable	  to	  develop	  this	  system	  for	  most	  of	  its	  history	  as	  competing	  and	  polarized	  factions	  consistently	  undermined	  any	  attempt	  to	  create	  strong,	  stable	  governmental	  and	  political	  institutions.	  	  Populist	  leaders	  emerged	  as	  the	  face	  of	  whichever	  faction	  was	  the	  most	  powerful	  at	  any	  given	  point	  in	  time,	  and	  the	  military	  felt	  forced	  to	  intervene	  whenever	  this	  leader	  lost	  legitimacy	  as	  no	  strong	  political	  institutions	  or	  parties	  that	  could	  have	  efficiently	  removed	  poor	  leaders	  from	  power	  existed.	  	  Constant	  intervention	  normalized	  the	  intrusion	  of	  the	  military	  in	  the	  civilian	  sphere	  of	  government,	  and	  made	  the	  formation	  of	  strong	  political	  institutions	  that	  would	  have	  provided	  an	  avenue	  for	  legitimate	  turnover	  of	  government	  and	  an	  effective	  subordination	  of	  the	  Argentinean	  military	  impossible.	  	  The	  dearth	  of	  strong	  governmental	  institutions	  propagated	  this	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  populist	  leaders	  and	  subsequent	  removals	  of	  these	  leaders	  by	  the	  military,	  leading	  to	  the	  extreme	  polarization	  Argentinean	  society	  and	  culminating	  in	  the	  final	  military	  junta	  of	  1976,	  which	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  clandestine	  disappearance	  and	  murder	  of	  approximately	  30,000	  Argentineans.	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Mexico	  
	   The	  relationship	  between	  the	  Mexican	  military	  and	  its	  civilian	  government	  could	  quite	  easily	  have	  gone	  down	  a	  similar	  path	  as	  the	  Argentinean	  case	  of	  consistent	  intervention.	  	  However,	  some	  key	  societal	  conditions	  and	  a	  couple	  great	  decisions	  by	  early	  20th	  century	  Mexican	  leadership	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  an	  institutionally	  strong	  government,	  headed	  by	  an	  extremely	  powerful	  office	  of	  the	  president,	  under	  which	  the	  Mexican	  military	  was	  effectively	  subordinated.	  	  The	  Mexican	  government	  and	  presidency	  were	  supported	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Partido	  Revolucionario	  Institucional	  (PRI),	  which	  legitimized	  the	  Mexican	  government	  and	  helped	  to	  streamline	  the	  transition	  of	  power	  between	  administrations.	  	  The	  military’s	  faith	  in	  the	  government’s	  capacity	  to	  maintain	  control,	  even	  during	  moments	  of	  crisis	  such	  as	  the	  1968	  student	  protests,	  was	  unparalleled	  in	  Latin	  America	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  and	  demonstrates	  how	  institutionally	  strong	  and	  stable	  the	  Mexican	  government	  was,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  high	  level	  of	  professionalization	  and	  subordination	  that	  the	  Mexican	  military	  had	  obtained.	  	  Similarly	  to	  our	  study	  of	  Argentina,	  it	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  examine	  the	  historical	  consolidation	  of	  power	  within	  the	  Mexican	  government	  into	  civilian	  hands,	  and	  how	  the	  institutional	  strength	  of	  this	  civilian	  government,	  led	  by	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency,	  was	  able	  to	  effectively	  subordinate	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  civilian	  control.	  
The	  story	  of	  the	  modern	  Mexican	  government	  starts	  with	  the	  military	  dictatorship	  of	  Porfirio	  Díaz,	  which	  began	  in	  1876	  and	  lasted	  for	  more	  than	  three	  decades	  until	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  in	  1910.	  	  While	  the	  Díaz	  regime	  had	  initially	  been	  relatively	  popular	  among	  the	  Mexican	  people,	  increased	  repression	  and	  the	  expansion	  of	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economic	  policies	  that	  supported	  the	  large	  haciendas	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  the	  peasants	  created	  resentment	  and	  anger	  among	  the	  population,	  which	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  1910	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution.77	  	  The	  Revolution	  was	  a	  period	  of	  near	  anarchy	  in	  Mexico,	  with	  multiple	  different	  factions	  warring	  throughout	  the	  country,	  each	  guided	  by	  different	  sets	  of	  motivations.	  	  The	  revolution’s	  leaders	  had	  such	  different	  ideas	  that	  by	  its	  conclusion,	  the	  main	  conflict	  was	  occurring	  between	  the	  revolutionary	  generals,	  rather	  than	  against	  Porfirian	  troops.	  	  Despite	  this,	  there	  were	  some	  major,	  relatively	  universal	  ideals	  that	  would	  be	  used	  by	  the	  victors	  to	  create	  a	  proverbial	  myth	  of	  the	  Revolution	  that	  supported	  the	  emerging	  Mexican	  government,	  and	  the	  subordination	  of	  the	  military	  to	  its	  control.	  	  These	  ideals	  included	  the	  need	  for	  a	  peasant	  friendly	  policy	  of	  land	  reform,	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  democratic	  regime,	  a	  culture	  of	  indgenismo,	  and	  a	  growing	  Mexican	  nationalism.78	  The	  constitution	  of	  1917	  officially	  recognized	  some	  of	  these	  ideals	  in	  article	  123,	  which	  guaranteed	  a	  minimum	  wage	  for	  the	  Mexican	  worker,	  and	  Article	  27,	  which	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  land	  reform	  efforts,	  though	  these	  reforms	  never	  emerged	  in	  the	  way	  many	  of	  the	  revolutionaries	  probably	  imagined	  them.79	  	  	  Additionally,	  by	  the	  time	  the	  Revolution	  came	  to	  its	  conclusion,	  Mexican	  society	  was	  simply	  tired	  of	  violence	  and	  ready	  for	  a	  stable	  government	  that	  would	  include	  the	  peasantry	  in	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  new	  Mexico.	  	  
Mexico's	  first	  presidents	  were	  all	  important	  revolutionary	  generals.	  	  However,	  these	  generals	  recognized	  that	  it	  was	  the	  peasantry	  who	  had	  brought	  them	  to	  power,	  and	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attempted	  to	  accommodate	  some	  of	  the	  principal	  desires	  of	  the	  masses	  into	  their	  policies.	  	  The	  first	  post	  revolutionary	  president,	  Alvaro	  Obregón,	  introduced	  many	  new	  reforms	  designed	  to	  help	  Mexican	  workers,	  however	  they	  never	  translated	  into	  the	  real,	  significant	  improvements	  promised.80	  	  Obregón's	  land	  reform	  policies	  were	  the	  first	  major	  set	  of	  preemptive	  reforms,	  or	  sets	  of	  policies	  created	  by	  political	  elites	  to	  minimize	  political	  mobilization	  in	  the	  less	  advantaged	  sectors	  of	  society	  before	  it	  begins.	  	  The	  success	  of	  these	  types	  of	  policies	  is	  relatively	  unimportant,	  as	  their	  goal	  is	  simply	  to	  pacify	  the	  masses	  and	  do	  just	  enough	  to	  quell	  any	  rumblings	  of	  dissent	  in	  the	  general	  public	  in	  the	  short	  run.81	  	  Preemptive	  reform	  would	  often	  be	  used	  as	  a	  method	  to	  gain	  political	  capital	  for	  Mexican	  leaders	  throughout	  the	  20th	  century,	  especially	  following	  moments	  of	  crisis.	  	  	  
Additionally,	  Obregón	  took	  some	  very	  important	  steps	  in	  subordinating	  the	  Mexican	  military	  to	  the	  office	  of	  the	  president,	  which	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  future,	  more	  comprehensive	  subordination	  efforts	  that	  President	  Calles	  and	  President	  Cárdenas	  would	  undertake	  in	  the	  future.	  	  First,	  Obregón	  cut	  the	  size	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  in	  half,	  a	  logical	  step	  given	  that	  Mexican	  society	  was	  trying	  to	  emerge	  from	  a	  decade	  of	  turmoil	  and	  war.82	  	  Second,	  he	  began	  rotating	  military	  commanders	  through	  different	  zones,	  which	  diminished	  their	  ability	  to	  establish	  a	  loyal	  base	  of	  officers	  and	  enlisted	  men	  whose	  fidelity	  could	  be	  used	  in	  a	  revolt	  against	  the	  government.83	  	  Finally,	  he	  recruited	  highly	  educated	  civilians	  into	  prominent	  government	  posts,	  thus	  making	  his	  government	  a	  composition	  of	  military	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and	  civilians	  leaders.84	  	  Obregón	  was	  able	  to	  implement	  these	  changes	  due	  to	  his	  status	  as	  an	  important	  revolutionary	  general	  whose	  control	  of	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency	  also	  gave	  him	  the	  authority	  to	  act	  as	  supreme	  military	  commander.	  	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  office	  was	  supported	  through	  the	  use	  of	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  in	  his	  political	  rhetoric,	  which	  supported	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  liberal,	  revolutionary	  government,	  rather	  than	  a	  return	  to	  the	  oligarchic	  military	  rule	  of	  the	  Díaz	  regime,	  or	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  populist	  regime	  under	  his	  control.	  
When	  General	  Plutarco	  Calles	  took	  over	  the	  presidency	  from	  Obregón	  in	  1924,	  he	  was	  determined	  to	  continue	  and	  enhance	  the	  subordination	  and	  professionalization	  efforts	  that	  Obregón	  had	  begun.	  	  He	  reopened	  the	  Colegio	  Militar	  and	  reformed	  its	  curriculum	  to	  more	  accurately	  reflect	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  emerging	  Mexican	  state.85	  Additionally,	  he	  updated	  promotion	  laws	  within	  the	  military,	  forcing	  officers	  to	  take	  tests	  requiring	  further	  military	  training	  in	  order	  to	  receive	  a	  promotion,	  which	  increased	  professionalization	  in	  the	  military	  as	  a	  whole,	  and	  reduced	  the	  need	  for	  officers	  to	  involve	  themselves	  in	  politics	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  their	  professional	  goals.	  	  Finally,	  he	  further	  cut	  the	  overall	  number	  of	  troops,	  and	  decreased	  the	  army's	  budget.86	  	  Upon	  leaving	  office,	  Calles	  placed	  two	  ex-­‐generals	  but	  current	  civilians	  into	  the	  office	  of	  presidency,	  who	  would	  rule	  from	  1928-­‐1934,	  when	  President	  Cárdenas	  took	  over.87	  	  While	  Calles	  remained	  the	  true	  power	  holder	  throughout	  these	  years,	  this	  was	  still	  the	  first	  time	  that	  the	  Mexican	  presidency	  had	  been	  occupied	  by	  a	  civilian,	  albeit	  with	  deep	  military	  ties,	  and	  set	  a	  precedent	  of	  renouncing	  all	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military	  duties	  upon	  entering	  into	  the	  political	  sphere	  that	  after	  Cárdenas'	  presidency,	  would	  become	  standard.	  
Another	  important	  part	  of	  the	  Calles	  presidency	  was	  his	  creation	  of	  the	  Partido	  Nacional	  Revolucionario	  (PRN),	  which	  would	  eventually	  change	  its	  name	  to	  the	  PRI	  and	  secure	  a	  dominant,	  hegemonic	  rule	  over	  Mexican	  politics	  until	  the	  mid	  1990's.	  	  Calles	  realized	  that	  the	  newly	  formed	  Mexican	  government	  could	  go	  one	  of	  three	  directions,	  he	  could	  personally	  seize	  power	  and	  assume	  a	  dictatorial	  role	  (something	  he	  did	  not	  want),	  the	  army	  could	  find	  a	  different	  general	  or	  group	  of	  generals	  to	  run	  the	  state,	  or	  an	  entirely	  separate	  mechanism	  could	  be	  created	  to	  ensure	  regular	  presidential	  succession	  and	  prevent	  the	  return	  of	  a	  dictatorship	  to	  Mexico.88	  	  With	  support	  from	  other	  important	  generals	  and	  political	  leaders,	  Calles	  chose	  this	  third	  option,	  and	  began	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  new	  party,	  the	  PNR.	  	  The	  new	  party	  would	  exemplify	  the	  key	  ideals	  of	  the	  Revolution,	  as	  understood	  by	  Calles,	  and	  would	  incorporate	  groups	  that	  typically	  reside	  in	  civil	  society	  such	  as	  the	  newly	  forming	  workers	  unions	  and	  all	  local	  government	  parties.89	  	  The	  inclusion	  of	  these	  groups	  bolstered	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  PRN	  and	  helped	  create	  an	  infrastructure	  that	  went	  beyond	  the	  federal	  level,	  and	  incorporated	  all	  aspects	  of	  society.	  	  The	  formation	  of	  the	  PNR	  went	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  military	  subordination	  efforts	  taking	  place,	  as	  for	  the	  new	  party	  to	  be	  effective,	  the	  military	  would	  have	  to	  relinquish	  its	  dominant	  position	  of	  control	  in	  the	  Mexican	  political	  scene.	  	  When	  Cárdenas	  came	  into	  office,	  he	  realized	  that	  the	  consolidation	  of	  this	  party’s	  power	  would	  transfer	  the	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responsibility	  for	  protecting	  the	  Mexican	  state	  from	  a	  dictator’s	  rule	  from	  the	  military’s	  hands	  to	  the	  civilian	  government	  by	  providing	  a	  legitimate	  institution	  that	  would	  support	  the	  president’s	  choice	  of	  successor	  in	  their	  path	  to	  the	  presidency.	  	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  PNR	  civilianized	  the	  legitimate	  transfer	  of	  power	  from	  one	  Mexican	  head	  of	  state	  to	  the	  next,	  and	  made	  the	  military	  feel	  comfortable	  in	  removing	  itself	  from	  its	  role	  of	  ensuring	  regular	  presidential	  succession.	  
	   When	  Cárdenas	  took	  power	  in	  1934,	  it	  was	  after	  nearly	  10	  years	  of	  direct	  or	  indirect	  rule	  by	  Calles,	  who	  commanded	  significant	  influence	  among	  the	  Mexican	  military	  as	  well	  as	  in	  important	  political	  circles.	  	  Thus	  the	  first	  important	  step	  to	  consolidating	  his	  power	  and	  the	  power	  of	  the	  newly	  forming	  party	  was	  to	  expel	  Calles	  from	  Mexico,	  and	  remove	  all	  his	  followers	  from	  positions	  of	  political	  importance.90	  	  These	  moves	  removed	  any	  personalistic	  influence	  that	  remained	  of	  Calles	  within	  Mexican	  government	  and	  military,	  and	  consolidated	  and	  legitimized	  the	  office	  of	  the	  president	  as	  the	  primary	  power	  holder	  of	  the	  new	  state	  rather	  than	  any	  individual	  leader.91	  	  Cárdenas	  then	  used	  the	  power	  of	  the	  presidency	  to	  strengthen	  the	  power	  of	  the	  PNR,	  which	  he	  renamed	  the	  Partido	  de	  la	  Revolución	  Mexicana	  (PRM).	  	  	  
His	  first	  move	  was	  to	  reorganize	  the	  party	  to	  include	  equal	  representation	  from	  military,	  labor,	  peasant,	  and	  popular	  sectors,	  symbolically	  and	  literally	  telling	  the	  military	  that	  they	  would	  receive	  no	  special	  influence	  or	  treatment	  in	  his	  government.92	  	  This	  move	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was	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  separate	  military	  class	  in	  society,	  and	  thereby	  creating	  a	  powerful	  force	  that	  would	  act	  in	  its	  own	  best	  interests	  rather	  than	  those	  of	  the	  state.93	  	  However,	  rather	  than	  further	  subordinating	  the	  military	  to	  civilian	  control,	  this	  move	  sent	  mixed	  messages	  to	  a	  military	  who	  had	  by	  this	  point	  been	  trained	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  the	  civilian	  political	  sphere,	  and	  the	  decision	  was	  in	  fact	  protested	  by	  some	  of	  the	  confused	  military	  members.	  	  Now,	  the	  with	  the	  military’s	  informal	  connections	  to	  the	  government	  and	  its	  official	  representation	  in	  the	  new	  party,	  the	  military	  sector	  was	  clearly	  the	  most	  powerful	  in	  the	  PRM.94	  	  The	  one	  positive	  aspect	  of	  incorporation	  was	  unification	  of	  civilian	  and	  military	  interests	  behind	  Cárdenas’,	  and	  thus	  the	  party’s,	  choice	  of	  successor.	  	  As	  all	  of	  the	  nominees	  for	  important	  roles	  were	  military	  men,	  the	  incorporation	  of	  the	  military	  into	  the	  PRM	  enabled	  these	  candidates	  to	  present	  themselves	  as	  party	  members,	  rather	  than	  military	  leaders,	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  military,	  thus	  reducing	  the	  personalist	  ties	  that	  necessarily	  formed	  in	  a	  superior	  to	  subordinate	  relationship.	  	  However,	  Cárdenas’	  successor,	  Manuel	  Avila	  Camacho,	  recognized	  the	  danger	  in	  the	  continued	  participation	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  in	  the	  political	  realm	  of	  the	  party,	  and	  he	  reversed	  Cárdenas’	  decision	  to	  incorporate	  the	  military	  into	  the	  party.95	  	  This	  cemented	  the	  civilian	  authority	  over	  the	  armed	  forces,	  literally	  and	  symbolically	  in	  his	  presentation	  of	  a	  new	  form	  of	  civil	  military	  relations	  that	  clearly	  separated	  and	  removed	  the	  Mexican	  military	  from	  all	  political	  decision	  making	  roles	  and	  capabilities.96	  
With	  the	  military	  subordinate	  yet	  still	  somewhat	  involved	  in	  his	  new	  party	  structure,	  Cárdenas	  embarked	  on	  new	  professionalization	  efforts,	  first,	  by	  encouraging	  the	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promotion	  of	  younger,	  and	  thus	  more	  recently	  trained,	  officers,	  and	  by	  lowering	  the	  maximum	  retirement	  age,	  which	  forced	  some	  older,	  and	  perhaps	  less	  loyal,	  generals	  into	  retirement.97	  	  This	  move	  strengthened	  the	  executive’s	  power,	  and	  made	  it	  harder	  for	  leaders	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  take	  control,	  as	  the	  newly	  trained	  officer	  corps	  had	  loyalty	  to	  the	  Mexican	  state,	  rather	  than	  personal	  ties	  to	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  military.98	  	  After	  his	  removal	  of	  the	  military	  from	  the	  national	  party,	  President	  Avila	  Camacho	  continued	  these	  efforts	  at	  professionalization,	  retiring	  many	  older,	  revolutionary	  generals	  without	  the	  technical	  knowledge	  for	  modern	  warfare,	  and	  then	  reducing	  the	  military	  expenditures	  from	  21	  to	  15	  percent	  of	  the	  national	  budget.99	  	  Finally,	  the	  start	  of	  WWII	  enabled	  larger	  numbers	  of	  Mexican	  officers	  to	  train	  in	  the	  US,	  increasing	  the	  technical	  knowledge	  and	  professionalization	  among	  the	  military’s	  future	  leaders.100	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  Avila	  Camacho’s	  presidency,	  the	  military	  had	  been	  fully	  subordinated	  to	  civilian	  control	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  increased	  professionalization	  efforts,	  and	  the	  literal	  and	  symbolic	  removal	  of	  the	  military	  from	  all	  political	  roles	  in	  the	  new	  party	  and	  state.	  
The	  professionalization	  and	  subordination	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  under	  Cárdenas,	  resulted	  in	  a	  marginalization	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Mexican	  military	  in	  the	  political	  sphere,	  which	  in	  turn	  legitimized	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency	  as	  the	  sole	  political	  power	  holder	  in	  Mexico.	  	  However,	  the	  military	  was	  still	  a	  powerful	  force	  within	  society,	  and	  thus	  an	  informal	  agreement	  regarding	  the	  new	  power	  balance	  between	  the	  Mexican	  military	  and	  the	  civilian	  government	  was	  created.	  	  In	  this	  special	  agreement,	  the	  military	  agreed	  to	  stay	  out	  of	  politics	  in	  return	  for	  a	  sizeable	  amount	  of	  autonomy	  over	  things	  like	  military	  budgets	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and	  training.	  	  The	  agreement	  was	  grounded	  in	  the	  ideas	  that	  the	  military	  should	  have	  a	  respect	  for	  civilian	  power,	  that	  arms	  are	  not	  a	  suitable	  instrument	  to	  further	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Revolution,	  and	  that	  the	  organization	  and	  maintenance	  of	  power	  in	  Mexico	  is	  not	  contingent	  on	  the	  support	  of	  the	  armed	  forces.101	  	  Because	  of	  this	  agreement,	  the	  military	  accepts	  the	  President	  of	  Mexico	  as	  its	  supreme	  commander,	  is	  obligated	  to	  recognize	  the	  laws	  created	  by	  the	  civilian	  government	  as	  legitimate,	  and	  allows	  the	  government	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  managing	  the	  economy,	  developing	  natural	  resources,	  and	  distributing	  income	  as	  it	  sees	  fit.102	  	  As	  commander	  in	  chief,	  the	  President	  assigns	  all	  the	  tasks	  and	  functions	  of	  the	  armed	  forces,	  and	  is	  technically	  responsible	  for	  all	  military	  appointments	  and	  promotions,	  though	  per	  the	  agreement	  these	  are	  mostly	  left	  up	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  military	  authorities.103	  	  This	  agreement	  was	  made	  possible	  by	  the	  military	  professionalization	  efforts	  of	  Cárdenas,	  and	  his	  establishment	  of	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  Mexican	  presidency	  as	  the	  most	  important	  power	  holder	  in	  Mexico,	  above	  any	  particular	  leader’s	  personal	  influence	  and	  power.	  	  Cárdenas’	  consolidation	  and	  legitimization	  of	  the	  power	  of	  the	  office	  of	  the	  President,	  rather	  than	  of	  the	  person	  who	  happened	  to	  hold	  it,	  created	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  subordination	  of	  the	  military	  was	  not	  only	  possible,	  but	  the	  best	  option	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  Mexican	  military	  and	  state.	  
The	  constitution	  that	  emerged	  after	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  had	  given	  the	  President	  of	  Mexico	  an	  enormous	  amount	  of	  power.	  	  Given	  the	  desire	  of	  the	  Mexican	  public	  to	  move	  away	  from	  an	  autocratic	  system	  of	  government	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Porfirio	  Díaz	  regime,	  the	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super	  presidency	  was	  a	  dangerous	  creation	  for	  the	  new	  Mexican	  state.	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  the	  constitution	  mandated	  that	  no	  president	  could	  serve	  more	  than	  one	  term,	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  a	  new	  dictatorship	  would	  not	  arise	  out	  of	  the	  ashes	  of	  the	  recently	  dispatched	  one.	  	  Until	  Calles,	  the	  military	  had	  ensured	  the	  clean	  succession	  of	  power	  when	  a	  president’s	  term	  was	  up.	  	  Calles	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  PNR	  in	  order	  to	  help	  remove	  the	  military	  from	  the	  decision	  over	  the	  succession	  of	  power.	  	  However,	  as	  he	  remained	  heavily	  involved	  in	  government,	  and	  handpicked	  his	  successors,	  his	  personalist	  influence	  on	  Mexican	  government	  was	  palpable,	  and	  risked	  a	  return	  to	  an	  autocratic	  style	  of	  government	  despite	  his	  official	  exit	  from	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency.	  	  Cárdenas	  also	  picked	  his	  successor,	  but	  he	  supported	  his	  choice	  through	  the	  mechanism	  of	  his	  newly	  created	  party,	  and	  once	  out	  of	  office,	  he	  stayed	  there,	  allowing	  Avila	  Camacho	  to	  rule	  as	  his	  own	  president.104	  	  Since	  this	  transition,	  the	  party	  has	  managed	  the	  presidential	  succession	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  President,	  supporting	  his	  choice	  of	  a	  successor	  throughout	  the	  election	  process,	  and	  providing	  a	  sense	  of	  legitimacy	  to	  their	  candidacy.	  	  The	  institutional	  ability	  of	  the	  PRI	  to	  reliably	  facilitate	  the	  transition	  of	  power	  from	  one	  president	  to	  the	  next	  replaced	  the	  need	  for	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  manage	  this	  change.	  	  The	  armed	  forces	  felt	  safe	  subordinating	  themselves	  to	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency	  as	  an	  avenue	  for	  presidential	  succession	  was	  predetermined,	  rather	  than	  attaching	  themselves	  to	  a	  particular	  leader	  from	  within	  their	  own	  ranks	  and	  risking	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  personalist	  ruler	  seizing	  control.	  	  This	  trust	  allowed	  the	  military	  to	  focus	  its	  efforts	  on	  increased	  professionalization	  and	  modernization,	  thus	  enhancing	  its	  capabilities	  and	  allowing	  it	  to	  stick	  to	  roles	  that	  it	  was	  designed	  for	  and	  trained	  to	  handle.	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By	  the	  end	  of	  Avila	  Camacho’s	  presidency,	  the	  military	  had	  been	  effectively	  removed	  from	  the	  civilian	  government	  and	  subordinated	  to	  civilian	  control,	  a	  fact	  proved	  by	  their	  acceptance	  of	  Miguel	  Alemán,	  a	  pure	  civilian,	  as	  Avila	  Camacho’s	  successor.	  	  The	  subordination	  of	  the	  military	  is	  further	  exemplified	  through	  the	  percent	  of	  military	  men	  in	  government	  during	  Obregón’s	  and	  Calles’	  presidencies,	  37	  percent,	  and	  the	  percentage	  during	  Alemán’s	  tenure,	  just	  8	  percent.105	  Yet	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  Mexican	  military	  had	  been	  subordinated	  did	  not	  mean	  that	  it	  had	  become	  entirely	  depoliticized.	  	  Despite	  the	  drastically	  diminished	  number	  of	  military	  men	  directly	  elected	  or	  assigned	  to	  posts	  during	  Alemán’s	  presidency,	  a	  military	  presidential	  staff	  was	  created	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  much	  closer	  liaison	  between	  the	  President	  and	  the	  armed	  forces.106	  	  Additionally,	  the	  military	  has	  been	  used	  to	  carry	  out	  many	  operations	  that	  are	  political	  in	  nature.	  	  These	  include,	  enforcement	  of	  political	  decisions	  such	  as	  removing	  rebellious	  governors	  and	  “defending”	  elections,	  intelligence	  gathering,	  repression	  of	  riots	  and	  protests,	  pacification	  of	  labor	  disputes,	  and	  destruction	  of	  potential	  guerrilla	  movements.107	  Despite	  the	  political	  nature	  of	  many	  of	  these	  activities,	  the	  armed	  forces	  have	  never	  taken	  action	  without	  explicit	  orders	  from	  the	  civilian	  government.	  	  Furthermore,	  all	  of	  these	  actions	  can	  be	  viewed	  from	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  special	  civil	  military	  relationship	  and	  as	  protecting	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency	  from	  internal	  crises.	  	  Even	  in	  the	  moment	  of	  most	  dire	  crisis,	  when	  the	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strength	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  appeared	  to	  be	  in	  doubt,	  the	  military	  waited	  for	  explicit	  approval	  of	  the	  President	  before	  intervening.108	  
In	  the	  years	  immediately	  following	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution,	  the	  most	  serious	  crises	  to	  threaten	  the	  state	  were	  armed	  rebellions,	  which	  clearly	  came	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  military	  to	  repress.	  	  But	  in	  1968,	  after	  years	  of	  political	  stability,	  a	  wave	  of	  massive	  protests	  led	  by	  students	  in	  Mexico	  City	  threatened	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  by	  questioning	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  its	  most	  powerful	  and	  important	  institution,	  the	  presidency.	  	  The	  military	  was	  called	  in	  to	  repress	  the	  riots,	  which	  they	  did,	  violently,	  thereby	  preserving	  the	  power	  of	  the	  civilian	  government	  without	  ever	  threatening	  any	  sort	  of	  military	  takeover	  of	  government.	  	  What	  happened	  in	  1968,	  and	  why	  did	  the	  Mexican	  military	  remain	  subordinate	  to	  civilian	  control	  in	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  many	  other	  militaries	  in	  Latin	  America	  during	  this	  time	  period	  would	  likely	  have	  taken	  control	  of	  the	  country	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  preserving	  and	  protecting	  the	  state	  from	  perceived	  internal	  threats?	  
	   On	  July	  23rd,	  1968,	  a	  small	  number	  of	  students	  in	  Mexico	  City	  were	  involved	  in	  a	  fight	  for	  no	  particular	  reason,	  certainly	  without	  any	  political	  motivations.	  	  Yet	  for	  some	  reason,	  the	  special	  riot	  police	  arrived	  to	  break	  up	  the	  fight,	  rather	  than	  normal	  cops.	  	  They	  chased	  some	  of	  the	  kids	  into	  a	  nearby	  university,	  where	  they	  proceeded	  to	  beat	  students,	  professors,	  and	  janitors	  indiscriminately.109	  	  An	  official	  protest	  of	  the	  police	  actions	  was	  planned	  and	  approved	  for	  July	  26th,	  but	  when	  it	  coincidentally	  merged	  with	  another,	  totally	  unrelated	  protest,	  it	  moved	  out	  of	  its	  approved	  zone.	  	  This	  prompted	  a	  harsh,	  violent	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response	  by	  the	  riot	  police	  in	  order	  to	  repress	  the	  students,	  who	  then	  barricaded	  themselves	  inside	  of	  their	  schools	  out	  of	  protest.110	  	  After	  three	  days	  of	  rising	  tensions,	  the	  police	  and	  army	  moved	  into	  the	  schools	  to	  violently	  disperse	  and	  arrest	  the	  students.	  	  This	  move	  was	  justified	  through	  claims	  that	  the	  Mexican	  communist	  party	  was	  behind	  the	  disruptions	  and	  was	  threatening	  the	  stability	  of	  society,	  an	  assertion	  that	  was	  entirely	  propaganda	  being	  used	  to	  discredit	  the	  movement	  and	  without	  factual	  evidence.111	  	  
The	  fighting	  came	  to	  an	  end	  on	  July	  31st,	  but	  protests	  continued	  throughout	  the	  month	  of	  August,	  developing	  into	  student	  and	  professor	  strikes,	  and	  becoming	  increasingly	  political	  in	  nature.	  	  Among	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  students	  were	  calls	  for	  a	  repeal	  of	  Articles	  145	  and	  145	  bis	  of	  the	  Mexican	  penal	  code,	  which	  allowed	  authorities	  to	  arrest	  people	  for	  their	  thoughts	  and	  words,	  freedom	  for	  all	  political	  prisoners,	  and	  justice	  for	  the	  wounded	  and	  murdered	  students.112	  	  At	  its	  peak,	  between	  200,000	  and	  400,000	  protestors	  gathered	  in	  front	  of	  the	  national	  palace	  where	  speakers	  broke	  with	  tradition	  when	  they	  criticized	  the	  President,	  Díaz	  Ordaz	  publicly.	  	  On	  August	  28th,	  the	  government	  decided	  that	  they	  had	  had	  enough,	  and	  called	  in	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  occupy	  Mexico	  City,	  eventually	  occupying	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  National	  Autonomous	  University	  of	  Mexico,	  the	  first	  time	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	  university	  had	  been	  so	  blatantly	  breached	  in	  forty	  years.113	  	  Thousands	  of	  students	  and	  professors	  were	  arrested	  in	  attempts	  to	  halt	  the	  protests.	  	  However,	  the	  straw	  that	  finally	  broke	  the	  protestors’	  backs	  came	  on	  October	  2nd	  when,	  after	  being	  shot	  upon,	  the	  army	  fired	  indiscriminately	  into	  the	  crowd	  at	  a	  peaceful	  but	  unauthorized	  protest,	  killing	  dozens	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and	  injuring	  hundreds	  more.114	  	  In	  reality	  the	  first	  shots	  were	  fired	  by	  government	  snipers	  dressed	  in	  civilian	  clothes	  among	  the	  protestors	  who	  had	  been	  ordered	  to	  fire	  upon	  the	  military	  by	  Díaz	  Ordaz	  in	  order	  to	  produce	  and	  justify	  the	  violent	  response	  from	  the	  military.115	  	  This	  violence	  effectively	  ended	  all	  public	  demonstrations	  against	  the	  government,	  and	  largely	  halted	  any	  political	  progress	  that	  was	  being	  made.	  	  The	  1968	  Olympics	  proceeded	  without	  a	  hitch,	  the	  PRI	  maintained	  a	  firm	  grip	  on	  its	  control	  of	  the	  Mexican	  political	  order,	  and	  students	  and	  professors	  slowly	  returned	  to	  class.116	  
	   The	  student	  protests	  of	  1968	  were	  a	  shock	  to	  the	  Mexican	  government	  and	  forced	  Mexico’s	  political	  leaders	  to	  reevaluate	  their	  position	  in	  society.	  	  Though	  the	  government	  had	  maintained	  control,	  it	  had	  necessitated	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  and	  the	  complete	  willingness	  and	  cooperation	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  carry	  out	  the	  government’s	  orders.	  	  The	  army	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  pull	  units	  out	  of	  the	  provinces	  to	  help	  stabilize	  Mexico	  City,	  and	  had	  the	  protests	  spread	  beyond	  the	  city	  to	  the	  provinces,	  the	  government	  would	  likely	  have	  lost	  control.117	  	  When	  Luis	  Echeverría	  assumed	  the	  presidency	  in	  1970,	  he	  introduced	  a	  set	  of	  preemptive	  reforms	  designed	  to	  pacify	  any	  remaining	  negative	  sentiments	  among	  the	  Mexican	  population	  over	  what	  had	  happened	  in	  1968,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  help	  stimulate	  the	  struggling	  Mexican	  economy.	  	  These	  reforms	  included	  attempts	  to	  stimulate	  employment	  while	  also	  increasing	  wages	  and	  public	  expenditures	  on	  health	  and	  education.118	  	  Clearly,	  none	  of	  these	  policies	  fulfilled	  the	  demands	  of	  the	  protestors,	  and	  were	  rather	  a	  way	  for	  the	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new	  government	  to	  shift	  the	  people’s	  attention	  away	  from	  any	  bad	  feelings	  remaining	  from	  1968	  and	  on	  to	  a	  more	  positive	  future.	  	  These	  policies	  were	  mainly	  geared	  towards	  organized	  urban	  workers	  as	  an	  attempt	  to	  gain	  short-­‐term	  political	  capital	  among	  the	  urban	  population	  where	  the	  protests	  had	  been	  the	  strongest,	  and	  where	  support	  for	  the	  PRI	  had	  been	  the	  lowest.	  	  The	  motivation	  for	  these	  preemptive	  reforms	  is	  hard	  to	  miss,	  though	  they	  very	  likely	  may	  have	  done	  just	  enough	  to	  pacify	  any	  remaining	  negative	  sentiments	  towards	  the	  government	  and	  the	  PRI,	  and	  contributed	  to	  PRI	  dominance	  as	  the	  sole	  political	  party	  within	  Mexico	  for	  another	  20	  years.	  	  Additionally,	  they	  showed	  the	  armed	  forces	  that	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  civilian	  government	  were	  taking	  the	  unrest	  seriously,	  and	  were	  committed	  to	  preventing	  further	  outbreaks	  in	  the	  future.	  
	   The	  ability	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  chaos	  of	  1968	  and	  reestablish	  itself	  as	  a	  strong	  guiding	  force	  in	  Mexican	  society	  demonstrated	  to	  the	  military	  that	  a	  stable	  government	  existed	  that	  could	  be	  counted	  on	  to	  reliably	  manage	  threats	  to	  the	  Mexican	  state.	  	  Though	  the	  military	  was	  ultimately	  responsible	  for	  ending	  the	  student	  protests,	  they	  never	  took	  matters	  into	  their	  own	  hands;	  every	  action	  was	  taken	  with	  explicit	  instructions	  from	  the	  President	  or	  other	  civilian	  authorities.	  	  Equally	  important	  was	  the	  response	  of	  the	  civilian	  government	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  protests.	  	  A	  clean	  transition	  of	  power	  occurred	  between	  Díaz	  Ordaz	  and	  Echeverría,	  and	  Echeverría’s	  reforms	  helped	  to	  calm	  any	  lingering	  feelings	  of	  resentment	  over	  the	  actions	  of	  his	  predecessor.	  	  The	  government’s	  ability	  to	  adapt	  to	  fit	  the	  political	  needs	  of	  Mexican	  society	  was	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  civilian	  government	  and	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency.	  	  Faith	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  government	  to	  manage	  crises	  and	  adapt	  appropriately	  encouraged	  the	  military	  to	  feel	  comfortable	  in	  its	  retreat	  to	  its	  normal	  duties	  in	  the	  wake	  of	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the	  most	  politically	  turbulent	  period	  in	  Mexican	  history	  since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Revolution.	  	  Had	  the	  government	  been	  weak	  and	  unable	  to	  manage	  the	  crisis	  or	  its	  aftermath,	  perhaps	  the	  military	  would	  have	  intervened	  in	  the	  civilian	  political	  sphere	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  a	  collapse	  of	  the	  Mexican	  state.	  	  The	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  and	  presidency,	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  adapt	  to	  the	  changing	  needs	  of	  Mexican	  society	  kept	  the	  military	  feeling	  safe	  in	  its	  autonomous	  but	  subordinate	  position,	  and	  kept	  PRI	  candidates	  in	  power	  for	  another	  25	  years	  after	  the	  most	  serious	  political	  turmoil	  that	  Mexico	  had	  experienced	  since	  its	  consolidation	  as	  a	  modern	  state.	  
	   If	  the	  institutional	  strength	  and	  power	  of	  the	  Mexican	  presidency	  and	  civilian	  government	  were	  the	  most	  significant	  factors	  in	  subordinating	  the	  Mexican	  military	  to	  civilian	  control,	  what	  happened	  when	  this	  institutional	  strength	  was	  weakened	  by	  internal	  crises,	  and	  a	  breakup	  of	  the	  political	  party	  that	  had	  come	  to	  be	  synonymous	  with	  government	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  many	  Mexicans?	  	  The	  decline	  of	  the	  PRI	  began	  in	  the	  mid	  1980’s	  as	  the	  party	  fractionalized	  internally	  over	  the	  pursuit	  of	  reform	  policies.	  	  In	  1987,	  a	  group	  of	  angry	  priístas	  broke	  ranks	  and	  ran	  against	  the	  PRI’s	  establishment	  candidate,	  Carlos	  Salinas.119	  	  The	  rebels	  lost	  a	  close	  election,	  but	  established	  the	  Partido	  de	  la	  Revolución	  Democratica	  (PRD),	  which	  would	  become	  the	  main	  opposition	  party	  to	  the	  PRI,	  until	  the	  PAN	  won	  in	  the	  2000	  presidential	  election.120	  	  Realizing	  that	  the	  PRI’s	  position	  in	  Mexican	  society	  was	  precarious,	  Salinas	  instituted	  a	  set	  of	  policies	  designed	  to	  combat	  rural	  poverty,	  which	  effectively	  galvanized	  support	  in	  the	  early	  90’s.	  	  In	  1994,	  the	  PRI	  candidate,	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Ernesto	  Zedillo,	  won	  the	  presidential	  election	  just	  in	  time,	  as	  the	  peso	  crashed	  later	  that	  year,	  leading	  to	  a	  huge	  growth	  in	  support	  for	  the	  opposition.121	  	  The	  combination	  of	  the	  peso	  crash,	  along	  with	  some	  unfavorable	  policy	  decisions	  in	  the	  late	  80’s	  and	  early	  90’s,	  such	  as	  the	  privatization	  of	  industry	  and	  NAFTA	  reduced	  support	  for	  the	  Zedillo	  administration	  and	  by	  consequence	  for	  the	  PRI.	  	  When	  the	  Zapatista	  rebellion	  broke	  out	  in	  1994,	  faith	  in	  the	  Zedillo	  administration’s	  ability	  to	  manage	  the	  Mexican	  state	  and	  pick	  a	  competent	  successor	  from	  within	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  PRI	  was	  drastically	  reduced.122	  	  The	  PRI’s	  legitimacy	  was	  hurt,	  and	  President	  Zedillo,	  was	  forced	  to	  accept	  the	  opposition’s	  demands	  for	  electoral	  reform	  measures,	  which	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  PAN’s	  victory	  in	  the	  2000	  presidential	  campaign.123	  
	   As	  the	  PRI	  gradually	  lost	  its	  legitimacy	  and	  support	  in	  the	  country	  it	  had	  dominated	  for	  nearly	  three	  quarters	  of	  a	  century	  there	  was	  never	  any	  sort	  of	  attempt	  at	  military	  intervention	  in	  government.	  	  The	  principal	  reason	  for	  this	  was	  the	  high	  level	  of	  professionalization	  and	  modernization	  that	  the	  Mexican	  military	  had	  obtained	  by	  this	  point	  in	  its	  history.	  	  Discipline	  in	  the	  Mexican	  military	  is	  incredibly	  strict,	  especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  subordination	  to	  the	  civilian	  political	  sphere.	  	  Officers	  who	  publicly	  criticize	  the	  government	  are	  generally	  relieved	  of	  their	  duties,	  or	  transferred	  to	  the	  most	  unpleasant	  assignment	  possible.124	  	  As	  the	  PRI	  had	  been	  most	  important	  for	  ensuring	  that	  the	  President’s	  successor	  would	  have	  support	  and	  legitimacy	  during	  their	  run	  for	  office,	  and	  had	  not	  directed	  any	  sort	  of	  policy	  formation,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  presidency	  was	  held	  by	  a	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PRI	  party	  member	  or	  not	  was	  of	  no	  concern	  to	  the	  military.	  	  As	  long	  as	  the	  President	  was	  able	  to	  effectively	  utilize	  the	  power	  of	  their	  office,	  and	  could	  be	  reliably	  expected	  to	  exit	  the	  office	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  term,	  the	  military	  would	  still	  view	  themselves	  as	  subordinate	  to	  this	  institution.	  	  Additionally,	  the	  Mexican	  public	  expressed	  no	  desire	  for	  a	  military	  intervention	  in	  government,	  which	  reinforced	  the	  military’s	  subordination	  to	  civilian	  rule.125	  	  As	  the	  Mexican	  public	  was	  one	  of	  the	  driving	  forces	  behind	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  political	  power	  balance,	  there	  were	  no	  outside	  influences	  for	  the	  military	  to	  do	  something	  that	  went	  against	  all	  of	  its	  training.	  	  Finally,	  as	  the	  process	  of	  change	  was	  a	  slow	  one	  that	  did	  not	  involve	  any	  sort	  of	  violent	  uprising	  against	  the	  government,	  but	  was	  rather	  a	  result	  of	  multiple	  crises	  within	  both	  the	  PRI	  and	  within	  Mexican	  society,	  there	  was	  never	  a	  sole	  moment	  of	  crisis	  that	  spurred	  the	  military	  into	  action.	  	  It	  was	  able	  to	  observe	  and	  react	  accordingly	  to	  the	  changing	  political	  situation	  as	  events	  developed,	  rather	  than	  making	  rash	  decisions	  that	  would	  have	  had	  serious	  consequences	  for	  the	  future	  of	  Mexican	  government	  and	  democracy.	  
	   As	  Mexican	  society	  emerged	  from	  the	  violence	  and	  turmoil	  of	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution,	  it	  needed	  a	  stable	  government	  that	  had	  the	  potential	  to	  effect	  real	  change	  for	  its	  people	  based	  on	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  Revolution.	  	  With	  the	  strong	  leadership	  of	  post-­‐revolutionary	  presidents,	  Mexican	  society	  moved	  away	  from	  its	  history	  of	  military	  governments,	  and	  instead	  developed	  a	  strong	  institutional	  government	  controlled	  by	  the	  power	  of	  the	  presidency,	  the	  holders	  of	  which	  were	  able	  to	  effectively	  subordinate	  the	  military	  to	  the	  office	  as	  an	  institution	  rather	  than	  to	  any	  of	  their	  individual	  personalities.	  	  The	  government’s	  institutional	  strength	  created	  an	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  military	  felt	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Rodric Camp, Generals and Politicians in Mexico, 154. 
	   50	  
confident	  in	  the	  abilities	  of	  the	  president	  to	  manage	  internal	  and	  external	  threats	  to	  the	  Mexican	  state.	  	  The	  trust	  among	  the	  armed	  forces	  for	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  civilian	  government,	  allowed	  them	  to	  greatly	  professionalize	  and	  modernize	  their	  corps,	  which	  further	  subordinated	  them	  to	  civilian	  rule.	  	  By	  the	  time	  a	  true	  moment	  of	  crisis	  emerged	  in	  1968,	  the	  military	  was	  sufficiently	  professionalized	  and	  trusting	  of	  the	  capacity	  of	  the	  government	  to	  manage	  threats	  that	  it	  did	  not	  intervene	  until	  directly	  called	  upon	  by	  President	  Díaz	  Ordaz.	  	  The	  establishment	  of	  the	  PRI	  created	  an	  institution	  that	  efficiently	  and	  reliably	  presided	  over	  the	  transfer	  of	  power	  between	  leaders,	  which	  had	  previously	  been	  a	  key	  role	  for	  the	  military	  in	  preventing	  a	  regression	  to	  dictatorship.	  	  When	  the	  PRI	  began	  to	  lose	  its	  hold	  over	  the	  process	  of	  political	  succession	  in	  Mexico,	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  needed	  as	  an	  institution	  to	  safeguard	  the	  electoral	  process,	  and	  its	  removal	  from	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency	  never	  threatened	  the	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  presidency	  itself.	  	  The	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  and	  presidency	  was	  the	  key	  to	  the	  professionalization	  of	  the	  Mexican	  military,	  and	  even	  through	  moments	  of	  crisis,	  encouraged	  the	  military	  to	  remain	  true	  to	  its	  professional	  values,	  which	  honored	  and	  continued	  the	  tradition	  of	  military	  subordination	  to	  civilian	  rule	  throughout	  the	  20th	  century	  and	  into	  the	  modern	  day.	  
	  
Comparative	  Study:	  Argentina	  vs.	  Mexico	  
	   On	  the	  surface	  Argentina	  and	  Mexico	  appear	  very	  similar	  in	  their	  socio-­‐political	  histories.	  	  Both	  countries	  experienced	  decades	  of	  dictatorship	  under	  a	  military	  leader,	  a	  lack	  of	  true	  democracy	  until	  the	  last	  few	  decades,	  a	  series	  of	  heads	  of	  state	  who	  came	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directly	  from	  the	  military,	  and	  instances	  of	  violent	  repression	  against	  their	  own	  citizens	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  armed	  forces.	  	  Yet	  despite	  these	  surface	  similarities,	  Argentina’s	  political	  history	  is	  littered	  with	  military	  intervention	  in	  government,	  which	  culminated	  in	  the	  terrible	  military	  junta	  of	  1973,	  while	  after	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Porfirio	  Díaz	  dictatorship,	  Mexico	  effectively	  subordinated	  its	  military	  to	  civilian	  control,	  and	  after	  the	  mid	  1940’s,	  never	  saw	  a	  member	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  become	  the	  Mexican	  head	  of	  state.	  	  The	  crucial	  differentiating	  factor	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  was	  the	  existence	  or	  lack	  of	  strong	  political	  institutions.	  	  Helped	  by	  strong,	  future	  minded	  leaders,	  Mexico	  developed	  an	  institutionally	  strong	  super	  presidency	  that	  resisted	  domination	  by	  any	  single	  personalist	  leader	  through	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  tradition	  of	  regular	  succession	  based	  on	  the	  ideals	  of	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  and	  institutionalized	  by	  the	  PRI.	  	  Argentina	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  consistently	  followed	  leaders	  who	  catered	  to	  specific	  societal	  sectors,	  and	  led	  by	  their	  strength	  of	  personality	  alone,	  which	  discouraged	  the	  formation	  of	  strong	  political	  institutions	  and	  led	  to	  the	  frequent	  destabilization	  of	  society	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  power	  vacuums,	  which	  in	  turn	  encouraged	  the	  continued	  participation	  of	  the	  military	  in	  the	  political	  realm.	  	  This	  section	  aims	  to	  compare	  analytically	  why	  the	  strong	  political	  institutions	  in	  Mexico	  were	  able	  to	  mitigate	  other	  factors	  that	  in	  a	  less	  politically	  stable	  society	  could	  have	  encouraged	  the	  continued	  participation	  of	  the	  military	  in	  politics,	  while	  the	  inability	  of	  Argentina	  to	  place	  power	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  institutions	  rather	  than	  in	  individual	  leaders	  allowed	  these	  societal	  conditions	  to	  destabilize	  society	  and	  encourage	  the	  repeated	  intervention	  of	  the	  Argentinean	  military	  in	  civilian	  government.	  
Populism	  is	  a	  dangerous	  political	  tool	  for	  various	  reasons.	  	  Based	  in	  a	  cult	  of	  personality	  created	  by	  a	  charismatic	  leader	  who	  uses	  popular	  societal	  sentiments	  to	  further	  
	   52	  
their	  own	  political	  goals,	  it	  provides	  fertile	  ground	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  regime	  with	  power	  consolidated	  solely	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  leader.	  	  It	  has	  been	  used	  to	  stir	  up	  disillusioned	  and	  frenzied	  populations,	  perhaps	  most	  drastically	  in	  Hitler’s	  Germany,	  which	  resulted	  in	  the	  murder	  of	  six	  million	  Jews	  during	  the	  Holocaust.	  	  Its	  use	  of	  grandiose	  speeches	  to	  gain	  popular	  support	  for	  policies	  can	  negate	  the	  official	  political	  processes	  and	  institutions	  by	  seeking	  legitimacy	  from	  the	  masses	  rather	  than	  through	  political	  discourse.	  	  Populism	  encourages	  the	  formation	  of	  personal	  ties	  within	  government,	  as	  the	  key	  to	  gaining	  power	  in	  a	  populist	  system	  is	  by	  currying	  favor	  with	  the	  leader,	  rather	  than	  by	  progressive	  advancement	  through	  the	  system	  because	  of	  personal	  merit.	  	  This	  provides	  the	  leader	  with	  personal	  support	  rather	  than	  support	  for	  any	  sort	  of	  political	  party	  or	  mechanism	  to	  legitimize	  the	  leader	  and	  their	  policies.	  	  Without	  an	  official	  mechanism	  to	  support	  the	  leader’s	  policies,	  the	  only	  person	  capable	  of	  legitimately	  leading	  the	  movement	  is	  the	  leader	  themself.	  	  The	  entire	  ideology	  of	  the	  movement	  is	  based	  on	  the	  leader’s	  conception	  and	  dissemination	  of	  their	  politics	  to	  their	  followers.	  	  This	  system	  of	  legitimizing	  politics	  by	  the	  personality	  and	  discourse	  of	  one	  leader	  can	  quite	  clearly	  lead	  to	  an	  authoritarian	  takeover	  of	  government.	  	  By	  its	  nature,	  populism	  does	  not	  create	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  transition	  of	  power,	  and	  thus	  the	  leader	  either	  rules	  until	  they	  lose	  the	  ability	  to	  obtain	  popular	  support	  for	  their	  programs,	  they	  are	  forced	  out	  of	  power	  by	  an	  outside	  force,	  or	  they	  pass	  away,	  likely	  without	  leaving	  a	  clear	  successor	  to	  take	  their	  place.	  	  It	  would	  be	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  a	  populist	  movement	  to	  exist	  and	  rule	  effectively	  without	  its	  principle	  leader,	  as	  it	  is	  this	  same	  leader	  who	  gives	  the	  movement	  strength	  and	  legitimacy,	  rather	  than	  any	  sustainable	  institution	  in	  which	  their	  ideas	  can	  be	  formalized,	  institutionalized,	  and	  then	  supported	  through	  official	  political	  mechanisms.	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   Strong	  political	  institutions,	  whether	  they	  are	  political	  parties	  or	  governmental	  bodies,	  legitimize	  the	  power	  and	  structure	  of	  a	  government.	  	  They	  give	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  actions	  of	  a	  government	  as	  a	  whole,	  rather	  than	  to	  the	  decisions	  of	  a	  particular	  leader	  or	  group.	  	  When	  opposing	  forces	  disagree	  with	  decisions	  made	  by	  a	  government,	  there	  is	  no	  personal	  threat	  to	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  process.	  	  Opposition	  to	  a	  populist	  leader’s	  policies	  or	  politics	  is	  a	  direct	  affront	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  leader	  themself,	  while	  opposition	  to	  a	  government’s	  policies	  does	  not	  threaten	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  government	  to	  govern.	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  governments	  without	  populist	  leaders	  do	  not	  ever	  feel	  threatened	  by	  opposition	  to	  their	  policies,	  or	  that	  the	  opposition	  to	  a	  non-­‐populist	  government	  never	  denies	  the	  government’s	  leaders	  the	  legitimacy	  to	  govern,	  but	  rather	  that	  the	  institution	  of	  government	  itself	  is	  always	  granted	  the	  authority	  to	  administer.	  	  An	  illegitimate	  military	  government	  may	  not	  be	  based	  in	  the	  cult	  of	  any	  particular	  leader,	  but	  the	  system	  of	  government	  within	  which	  it	  resides	  will	  still	  be	  recognized	  as	  necessary	  by	  any	  rational,	  non-­‐anarchical,	  person.	  	  Thus	  a	  country	  with	  strong	  government	  institutions	  will	  be	  more	  able	  to	  adapt	  to	  threats,	  as	  its	  institutional	  strength	  will	  always	  maintain	  its	  legitimacy.	  	  If	  the	  ruling	  people	  or	  parties	  within	  the	  government	  are	  viewed	  as	  legitimate	  power	  holders	  within	  society,	  than	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  that	  government	  is	  greatly	  magnified.	  	  
Argentina’s	  populist	  leaders,	  such	  as	  Perón,	  prevented	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  strong	  government	  outside	  of	  their	  personalistic	  influence,	  thus	  negating	  the	  chance	  for	  Argentina	  to	  form	  a	  strong	  government	  whose	  legitimacy	  could	  stand	  on	  its	  own.	  	  This	  encouraged	  the	  military,	  an	  inherently	  strong	  institution,	  to	  intervene	  whenever	  things	  went	  south	  or	  they	  felt	  threatened	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  particular	  leaders	  operating	  with	  nothing	  other	  than	  popular	  support	  to	  legitimize	  them.	  	  Military	  leaders	  assumed	  that	  the	  masses	  are	  easily	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manipulated,	  and	  thus	  the	  use	  of	  their	  support	  to	  legitimize	  a	  government	  or	  leader	  was	  always	  suspect.	  	  With	  no	  legitimate	  structure	  to	  back	  the	  populist	  leaders,	  military	  intervention	  was	  always	  a	  viable	  option	  to	  secure	  what	  the	  military	  saw	  as	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  society.	  
Mexico	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  developed	  an	  incredibly	  strong	  institutional	  system	  of	  government.	  	  The	  office	  of	  the	  presidency	  was	  an	  extremely	  powerful	  position,	  and	  was	  respected	  and	  followed	  throughout	  the	  Mexican	  political	  system.	  	  The	  office	  of	  the	  president	  directed	  all	  policy,	  was	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  PRI,	  and	  enabled	  its	  holder	  to	  choose	  who	  would	  be	  his	  successor.	  	  The	  President’s	  authority	  was	  unquestioned	  in	  all	  branches	  and	  levels	  of	  government,	  and	  the	  military	  respected	  and	  trusted	  this	  authority	  to	  protect	  the	  Mexican	  state.	  	  Even	  if	  individual	  military	  members	  disagreed	  with	  a	  President’s	  politics	  privately,	  they	  still	  respected	  his	  legitimacy	  and	  authority	  in	  an	  official	  capacity	  because	  of	  their	  subordination	  to	  the	  office.	  	  The	  military’s	  professional	  values	  dictated	  that	  they	  respect	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  Mexican	  presidency	  as	  supreme	  commander	  of	  the	  armed	  forces,	  and	  the	  holder	  of	  the	  office	  never	  gave	  them	  reason	  to	  worry	  that	  it	  could	  not	  maintain	  control	  over	  the	  powers	  granted	  by	  this	  institution.	  	  Therefore,	  there	  was	  never	  any	  reason	  for	  the	  military	  to	  break	  with	  its	  professionalism	  and	  endanger	  the	  authority	  and	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  guiding	  institution	  of	  the	  Mexican	  state	  they	  had	  sworn	  to	  defend.	  
One	  of	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  show	  how	  the	  differences	  in	  political	  institutional	  strength	  affected	  the	  subordination	  efforts	  of	  each	  country’s	  military	  is	  by	  examining	  instances	  when	  society	  itself	  rebelled	  against	  the	  institution	  of	  government,	  and	  the	  way	  that	  each	  country	  was	  able	  to	  respond.	  	  In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century,	  communism	  and	  other	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“subversive”	  beliefs	  were	  often	  seen	  as	  the	  principal	  destabilizing	  threats	  to	  society.	  	  Subversion	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  threat	  that	  intentionally	  tries	  to	  undermine	  the	  established	  social	  and	  political	  order,	  and	  can	  potentially	  be	  present	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  society.126	  	  While	  not	  solely	  communist	  in	  its	  definition,	  the	  communist	  goals	  of	  a	  revolution	  arising	  from	  the	  proletariat	  designed	  to	  overthrow	  an	  oppressive	  bourgeois	  order,	  was	  certainly	  the	  most	  feared	  example	  of	  subversion,	  especially	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  era.	  	  Subversion	  must	  be	  combated	  in	  non-­‐traditional,	  political	  and	  psychological,	  ways	  in	  order	  to	  counteract	  its	  ability	  to	  invade	  and	  disrupt	  all	  sectors	  of	  society.127	  	  What	  did	  Argentina	  and	  Mexico	  do	  differently	  in	  handling	  internal,	  subversive	  threats	  to	  their	  society,	  and	  what	  role	  did	  their	  political	  institutions	  and	  leaders	  play?	  
When	  Perón	  mobilized	  the	  working	  industrial	  class,	  it	  was	  against	  an	  established	  oligarchic	  order	  that	  was	  used	  to	  being	  in	  control	  of	  the	  Argentinean	  economy	  and	  possessing	  significant	  influence	  in	  the	  political	  sphere	  as	  well.	  	  No	  matter	  how	  Perón	  had	  gone	  about	  organizing	  the	  working	  class,	  it	  would	  have	  felt	  threatening	  to	  this	  established	  oligarchy.	  	  However,	  his	  dramatic	  speeches	  to	  thousands	  of	  screaming	  Argentineans	  felt	  a	  lot	  more	  like	  a	  revolution	  attempting	  to	  break	  the	  established	  order	  than	  any	  real,	  lawful	  political	  discourse	  attempting	  to	  reform	  it.	  	  While	  at	  this	  point	  in	  Argentinean	  history	  there	  was	  already	  an	  entrenched	  pattern	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  politics,	  and	  little	  to	  no	  strong	  political	  institutions,	  the	  coup	  that	  dispatched	  Perón	  ironically	  called	  for	  a	  return	  to	  the	  "republican	  way	  of	  life,"	  they	  felt	  Perón	  had	  forsaken.128	  	  As	  the	  military	  was	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dispatching	  a	  democratically	  elected	  government,	  they	  clearly	  did	  not	  believe	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  true	  democracy,	  but	  rather	  wanted	  to	  restore	  the	  established	  order	  of	  government	  that	  they	  felt	  comfortable	  in.	  	  Though	  at	  this	  point	  Peronism	  may	  not	  have	  been	  directly	  defined	  as	  subversion,	  its	  subsequent	  prescription	  from	  the	  ballots	  showed	  the	  military's	  willingness	  to	  combat	  this	  threat	  to	  the	  established	  regime	  outside	  of	  the	  traditional	  norms.	  	  As	  Perón	  did	  not	  use	  political	  institutions	  to	  advance	  his	  policies,	  the	  military	  and	  other	  threatened	  societal	  factions	  felt	  they	  could	  not	  express	  their	  discontent	  in	  a	  traditional	  manner,	  and	  thus	  were	  forced	  to	  combat	  Peronism	  in	  non-­‐traditional	  ways.	  	  Peronism	  became	  subversion,	  and	  without	  strong	  institutions	  to	  support	  and	  legitimize	  it,	  there	  was	  nothing	  that	  could	  delegitimize	  the	  army's	  decision	  to	  go	  outside	  of	  these	  weak	  institutions	  to	  advance	  its	  goals.	  
The	  same	  argument	  can	  be	  made	  for	  the	  armed	  forces'	  treatment	  of	  what	  they	  saw	  as	  subversive	  elements	  in	  Argentina	  during	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1960's	  dictatorships,	  Perón's	  second	  government,	  and	  during	  the	  final	  military	  junta	  of	  1976.	  	  Please	  note	  that	  this	  is	  in	  no	  way	  a	  justification	  for	  the	  horrendous	  war	  crimes	  that	  these	  governments	  participated	  in	  against	  their	  own	  populations,	  but	  rather	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  why	  they	  acted	  in	  the	  way	  they	  did,	  and	  why	  Argentinean	  society	  did	  not	  have	  the	  mechanisms	  needed	  to	  exit	  the	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  repression	  and	  intervention	  it	  had	  found	  itself	  in.	  	  As	  support	  for	  the	  military	  governments	  of	  the	  60's	  declined,	  radical	  leftist	  Peronist	  groups	  began	  to	  form	  a	  strong	  and	  violent	  opposition	  to	  their	  rule.	  	  The	  prescription	  of	  Peronism	  from	  the	  ballots	  made	  these	  groups	  feel	  as	  though	  they	  had	  no	  legitimate	  place	  for	  their	  protests	  within	  the	  formal	  institutions	  of	  government,	  and	  thus	  pursued	  their	  motives	  outside	  of	  the	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traditional	  legal	  system.	  	  As	  violence	  between	  both	  groups	  increased,	  it	  became	  progressively	  more	  clandestine.	  	  The	  kidnapping	  and	  subsequent	  murder	  of	  General	  Aramburu	  by	  the	  Montoneros	  in	  1969,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  violent,	  clandestine	  repression	  of	  the	  left	  that	  followed,	  are	  perfect	  demonstrations	  of	  how	  the	  activities	  of	  these	  groups	  operated	  outside	  of	  society's	  institutions.129	  
As	  Perón	  never	  condemned	  the	  violence	  of	  these	  groups,	  and	  in	  reality	  supported	  many	  of	  their	  actions	  against	  the	  government,	  it	  was	  nearly	  impossible	  for	  him	  to	  plausibly	  deny	  their	  legitimacy	  to	  operate	  upon	  his	  return	  from	  exile.	  	  The	  split	  in	  Peronism	  between	  the	  radical	  left	  and	  the	  radical	  right	  meant	  that	  the	  political	  violence	  did	  not	  end	  with	  the	  return	  of	  Perón.	  	  Rather,	  years	  of	  intense	  fighting	  and	  clandestine	  organization	  against	  the	  military	  enabled	  groups	  like	  the	  Montoneros	  to	  create	  organizational	  structures	  and	  institutions	  like	  traditional	  armies.130	  	  Had	  strong	  governmental	  institutions	  existed,	  these	  extra-­‐societal	  institutions	  would	  have	  had	  no	  need	  and	  no	  ability	  to	  form	  within	  civil	  society	  at	  a	  level	  that	  rivaled	  and	  significantly	  threatened	  the	  military.	  	  Perón	  created	  a	  revolution	  within	  the	  legitimate	  context	  of	  official	  government,	  but	  his	  inability	  to	  institutionalize	  and	  consolidate	  the	  ideas	  and	  power	  of	  this	  revolution	  outside	  of	  his	  cult	  of	  personality	  and	  within	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  government	  office	  or	  institution	  forced	  the	  rest	  of	  society	  to	  form	  its	  own	  separate	  institutions	  and	  organizations	  outside	  of	  the	  official	  governmental	  sector	  in	  order	  to	  express	  their	  opinions	  that	  differed	  from	  Perón’s	  conception	  of	  society.	  	  As	  the	  armed	  forces	  was	  the	  oldest,	  best	  organized	  extra-­‐governmental	  institution,	  it	  was	  able	  to	  insert	  itself	  as	  a	  seemingly	  legitimate	  and	  dominant	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actor	  within	  Argentina's	  political	  sphere.	  	  The	  military's	  institutional	  strength	  rivaled	  or	  eclipsed	  any	  political	  movement's,	  and	  thus	  it	  justified	  itself	  in	  using	  this	  institutional	  strength	  to	  get	  what	  it	  wanted	  from	  Argentina's	  government,	  rather	  than	  going	  through	  weaker	  institutional	  channels.	  	  This	  pattern	  perpetuated	  itself,	  and	  by	  the	  time	  of	  Perón's	  populist	  movement	  of	  the	  50's,	  any	  strong	  political	  activity	  that	  went	  outside	  or	  threatened	  the	  established	  order	  of	  the	  Argentinean	  political	  system	  was	  viewed	  as	  subversion	  by	  the	  Argentinean	  military,	  and	  defended	  against	  accordingly.	  	  This	  prevented	  the	  creation	  of	  strong	  governmental	  organizations	  and	  institutions	  that	  could	  have	  acted	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  strong	  political	  movement	  to	  facilitate	  change	  and	  the	  cycle	  continued,	  until	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  final	  military	  junta	  forced	  Argentina	  to	  break	  and	  reform	  the	  established	  order.	  
Outside	  of	  the	  1968	  student	  protests,	  which	  have	  already	  been	  discussed,	  one	  of	  the	  best	  ways	  to	  look	  at	  subversion	  within	  Mexican	  society	  is	  through	  the	  roles	  of	  traditional	  "subversive"	  bastions	  within	  society,	  communist	  parties	  and	  organizations	  as	  well	  as	  labor	  unions.	  	  These	  groups	  have	  typically	  been	  associated	  with	  subversive	  activity	  due	  to	  their	  generally	  left	  leaning	  politics,	  and	  that	  their	  main	  avenues	  of	  support	  are	  generally	  derived	  from	  the	  lower	  economic	  classes	  of	  society.	  	  As	  has	  already	  been	  mentioned,	  Mexican	  workers	  were	  an	  important	  actor	  in	  the	  Revolution,	  and	  thus	  were	  afforded	  certain	  rights	  and	  benefits	  within	  the	  new	  Mexican	  state	  and	  constitution.	  	  While	  they	  were	  certainly	  a	  subordinate	  part	  of	  the	  new	  Mexican	  state,	  they	  were	  officially	  included,	  which	  was	  a	  real	  victory	  for	  the	  Mexican	  working	  class.131	  	  The	  creation	  of	  the	  Confederación	  Regional	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Obrera	  Mexicana	  in	  1918	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  mutual	  communication	  and	  support	  between	  the	  government	  elites	  and	  the	  working	  classes.	  	  This	  agreement	  forced	  the	  working	  classes	  to	  accept	  capitalism	  as	  the	  dominant	  economic	  system	  of	  the	  new	  state,	  but	  also	  legitimized	  their	  cause	  within	  the	  newly	  forming	  government,	  and	  assured	  the	  workers	  that	  they	  would	  not	  be	  entirely	  excluded	  from	  the	  Mexican	  state	  building	  project.	  	  While	  the	  inclusion	  of	  workers	  did	  not	  result	  in	  the	  myriad	  of	  reforms	  that	  many	  had	  hoped,	  it	  did	  lead	  to	  some	  changes	  for	  the	  workers,	  and	  was	  able	  to	  pacify	  any	  radical	  desires	  for	  communism	  within	  their	  ranks.	  
When	  Cárdenas	  consolidated	  the	  PRM	  into	  Mexico's	  only	  important	  political	  party,	  one	  that	  would	  manage	  the	  clean	  succession	  of	  the	  Mexican	  presidency	  for	  decades	  and	  would	  be	  the	  institutional	  backing	  for	  the	  Mexican	  government	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  he	  made	  sure	  that	  the	  party	  had	  equal	  representation	  from	  four	  sectors	  of	  society;	  military,	  peasant,	  popular,	  and	  labor.132	  	  The	  inclusion	  of	  labor	  into	  the	  official	  party	  structure	  told	  workers	  two	  things:	  first,	  you	  will	  be	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Mexican	  state	  and	  its	  future	  and	  second,	  you	  will	  have	  no	  special	  status	  and	  will	  remain	  subordinate	  to	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government.	  	  Additionally,	  Cárdenas	  created	  the	  Confederación	  de	  Trabajadores	  de	  México	  (CTM),	  which	  would	  unite	  the	  fractionalized	  labor	  movement	  under	  one	  organization.	  	  He	  stated	  that	  his	  government	  would	  deal	  exclusively	  with	  this	  organization,	  which	  was	  another	  way	  of	  saying	  that	  the	  state	  would	  essentially	  control	  organized	  labor,	  but	  that	  they	  would	  still	  be	  included	  and	  their	  interests	  would	  be	  recognized.133	  	  Though	  in	  many	  ways	  this	  ensured	  that	  organized	  labor	  would	  never	  get	  all	  of	  its	  demands,	  the	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popularity	  and	  strength	  of	  Cárdenas	  during	  this	  time	  forced	  labor	  unions	  to	  take	  what	  they	  could	  get,	  and	  agree	  to	  work	  with	  the	  government.	  	  The	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  and	  the	  PRI	  meant	  that	  being	  included	  was	  a	  better	  option	  than	  attempting	  to	  force	  change	  from	  the	  outside.	  	  From	  the	  inside,	  a	  movement	  could	  attempt	  to	  control	  and	  alter	  political	  discourse,	  while	  operating	  from	  the	  outside	  would	  likely	  have	  necessitated	  a	  revolution	  against	  the	  government,	  something	  that	  was	  not	  politically	  viable	  or	  literally	  feasible.	  
While	  various	  Mexican	  presidents	  worked	  to	  bring	  Mexican	  labor	  unions	  into	  the	  institutional	  political	  sphere,	  thus	  neutralizing	  the	  potential	  threat	  from	  these	  organizations,	  the	  same	  was	  not	  true	  of	  communist	  parties	  and	  movements	  within	  Mexico,	  which	  were	  inherently	  anti-­‐government	  in	  their	  nature.	  	  In	  some	  respects	  Mexico	  was	  lucky	  not	  to	  have	  a	  stronger	  communist	  presence.	  	  Many	  participating	  sectors	  in	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  could	  identify	  strongly	  with	  the	  Bolshevik	  Revolution	  that	  began	  in	  1917	  as	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution	  was	  coming	  to	  an	  end.134	  	  But	  the	  tyranny	  and	  oppression	  that	  arose	  following	  the	  Bolshevik	  Revolution	  caused	  a	  cooling	  off	  in	  Mexican	  revolutionary	  circles,	  and	  led	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  Mexican	  radicalism	  as	  a	  rival	  model	  to	  communism.135	  	  Thus	  when	  a	  congress	  designed	  to	  create	  a	  Mexican	  communist	  party	  was	  held	  in	  1919,	  many	  of	  its	  declarations	  were	  more	  anarchical	  in	  their	  nature,	  and	  the	  communist	  party	  (PCM)	  that	  emerged	  was	  weak.136	  	  Following	  a	  failed	  armed	  rebellion	  in	  1929	  they	  were	  outlawed	  and	  persecuted	  until	  the	  mid	  1930’s	  when	  Cárdenas	  allowed	  them	  to	  reorganize	  in	  order	  to	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support	  his	  land	  reform	  policies.137	  	  However,	  following	  Cárdenas,	  most	  Mexican	  presidents	  were	  far	  less	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  communists,	  and	  the	  party	  became	  divided	  among	  itself.138	  
By	  the	  mid	  1950’s,	  membership	  was	  down	  to	  approximately	  2,500	  members	  from	  its	  high	  of	  20,000	  in	  the	  late	  30’s.139	  	  Unlike	  communist	  parties	  and	  movements	  throughout	  Latin	  America	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  the	  PCM	  participated	  in	  relatively	  tame	  actions	  that	  mainly	  involved	  propaganda	  production	  and	  distribution,	  the	  goal	  of	  which	  was	  not	  to	  bring	  communism	  to	  power	  in	  Mexico,	  but	  rather	  to	  advance	  the	  prestige	  of	  international	  communism.140	  By	  the	  1970’s,	  the	  PCM	  was	  tired	  of	  repression	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  unsympathetic	  Mexican	  government.	  	  Rather	  than	  attempting	  a	  violent	  overthrow	  of	  government,	  for	  which	  they	  had	  neither	  the	  resources	  nor	  the	  political	  capital,	  the	  PCM	  decided	  to	  shift	  their	  objective	  away	  from	  the	  delusions	  of	  pushing	  the	  PRI	  to	  the	  left,	  to	  instead	  work	  towards	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  democratic	  Mexican	  government	  and	  society.141	  When	  the	  PCM	  opened	  itself	  up	  to	  participation	  from	  other	  left	  leaning	  parties	  and	  organizations	  that	  were	  not	  strictly	  communist,	  they	  were	  able	  to	  have	  some	  success	  in	  penetrating	  the	  Mexican	  government,	  even	  winning	  some	  seats	  in	  the	  legislature	  in	  the	  mid-­‐70’s,	  which	  more	  than	  anything	  was	  a	  sign	  of	  the	  declining	  dominance	  of	  the	  PRI.	  142	  
The	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  and	  the	  PRI	  were	  incredibly	  effective	  in	  diminishing	  the	  power	  and	  influence	  of	  communism	  within	  Mexico.	  	  Though	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they	  were	  helped	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  was	  never	  a	  strong	  communist	  presence	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  the	  Mexican	  government	  made	  sure	  that	  the	  communist	  party	  could	  not	  effectively	  disseminate	  its	  ideas	  to	  the	  Mexican	  public,	  often	  by	  shutting	  down	  communist	  printing	  presses	  or	  disrupting	  the	  postal	  service	  that	  carried	  the	  propaganda	  to	  its	  intended	  targets.143	  	  The	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  is	  perhaps	  best	  shown	  by	  Cárdenas'	  use	  of	  the	  PCM	  to	  support	  his	  programs	  for	  land	  reform,	  followed	  by	  subsequent	  governments’	  denial	  of	  the	  PCM's	  legitimacy	  and	  right	  to	  exist	  within	  the	  Mexican	  state.	  	  Cárdenas	  used	  the	  PCM	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  furthering	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  PRI	  and	  his	  government,	  even	  though	  its	  mandate	  was	  inherently	  opposed	  to	  the	  existing	  power	  structure.	  	  A	  less	  institutionally	  powerful	  government	  would	  never	  have	  dared	  to	  manipulate	  a	  communist	  party	  in	  this	  manner,	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  out	  of	  fear	  that	  the	  communist	  message	  could	  be	  inadvertently	  spread	  to	  the	  general	  public,	  no	  matter	  how	  little	  power	  they	  currently	  possessed	  within	  society.	  	  Without	  a	  credible	  threat	  to	  the	  Mexican	  state,	  the	  Mexican	  military	  had	  no	  reason	  feel	  threatened	  itself,	  or	  to	  get	  involved	  without	  direct	  requests	  from	  the	  government.	  	  The	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government	  was	  able	  to	  easily	  control,	  manipulate,	  and	  repress	  communist	  movements	  within	  Mexico,	  using	  the	  military	  only	  when	  necessary,	  and	  removing	  fears	  of	  any	  real	  destabilizing	  threats	  from	  a	  sector	  that	  while	  relatively	  weak,	  still	  had	  a	  message	  with	  the	  potential	  to	  resonate	  with	  the	  Mexican	  public.	  
One	  final	  area	  of	  comparison	  will	  help	  to	  solidify	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  differences	  in	  institutional	  strength	  between	  the	  Argentinean	  and	  Mexican	  governments	  during	  this	  time	  period,	  and	  how	  this	  strength	  affected	  the	  abilities	  of	  these	  respective	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governments	  to	  subordinate	  their	  militaries	  to	  civilian	  control;	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  US	  that	  each	  country	  had	  in	  this	  time	  period.	  	  After	  the	  start	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  US	  began	  its	  policy	  of	  containment,	  which	  hoped	  to	  limit	  the	  spread	  of	  communism	  and	  the	  Soviet	  sphere	  of	  influence	  as	  much	  as	  possible.	  	  This	  strategy	  often	  included	  supporting	  repressive	  and	  dictatorial	  regimes	  as	  long	  as	  they	  were	  sufficiently	  anti-­‐communist.	  	  Nowhere	  was	  this	  strategy	  more	  evident	  than	  in	  Latin	  America,	  where	  multiple	  dictatorial	  and	  military	  governments	  were	  helped	  or	  placed	  into	  power	  by	  the	  CIA	  and	  the	  US	  government	  largely	  without	  regard	  for	  the	  human	  rights	  abuses	  that	  these	  governments	  would	  go	  on	  to	  commit.	  	  	  
As	  political	  violence	  grew	  in	  Argentina	  during	  the	  late	  1960's,	  the	  US	  sent	  a	  team	  to	  train	  elite	  squads	  in	  Argentina	  for	  anti-­‐guerilla	  warfare.	  	  The	  mission	  of	  these	  groups	  was	  to	  combat	  subversion,	  and	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  for	  the	  military	  to	  win	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  the	  people.144	  	  Thus	  the	  US	  was	  already	  supporting	  the	  intrusion	  of	  the	  Argentinean	  military	  into	  the	  political	  realm	  during	  the	  military	  dictatorships	  of	  the	  60's,	  and	  had	  provided	  a	  precursory	  validation	  of	  the	  military's	  intervention	  in	  1976.	  	  Upon	  the	  return	  of	  democracy,	  the	  US	  likely	  provided	  financial	  assistance	  to	  the	  Triple	  A,	  Jose	  Lopez	  Rega's	  clandestine	  organization	  that	  fought	  outside	  the	  institutions	  of	  government	  against	  the	  far	  left	  extremist	  organizations	  within	  Argentina,	  legitimizing	  clandestine	  violence	  in	  Argentina	  even	  under	  a	  democratic	  state.145	  	  	  
The	  US	  had	  little	  to	  no	  faith	  that	  the	  institutions	  of	  Argentinean	  government	  would	  be	  strong	  enough	  to	  support	  themselves	  in	  the	  fight	  against	  communism,	  and	  thus	  they	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supported	  organizations	  that	  would	  work	  to	  combat	  subversion	  outside	  of	  these	  traditional	  institutions.	  	  As	  the	  military	  had	  already	  proved	  itself	  institutionally	  capable	  and	  willing	  to	  take	  control	  of	  the	  Argentinean	  political	  sphere,	  the	  US	  trusted	  the	  institutionally	  strong	  military	  to	  act	  more	  than	  they	  trusted	  the	  democratically	  elected	  government,	  and	  likely	  supported	  the	  military	  coup	  in	  1973,	  as	  well	  as	  implicitly	  supporting	  the	  political	  violence	  that	  followed	  it	  through	  the	  training	  that	  had	  been	  provided.	  	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  the	  US	  secretary	  of	  state	  at	  this	  time,	  is	  thought	  to	  have	  given	  approval	  for	  the	  coup,	  believing	  that	  the	  institutional	  strength	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  was	  better	  for	  US	  foreign	  interests	  than	  to	  take	  a	  chance	  with	  the	  unstable	  and	  institutionally	  weak	  democracy	  that	  was	  barely	  holding	  power.146	  	  While	  the	  military	  coup	  would	  likely	  have	  occurred	  with	  or	  without	  US	  approval,	  the	  support	  of	  the	  US	  for	  the	  military's	  intervention	  in	  politics	  shows	  how	  little	  faith	  they	  had	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  legally	  elected	  Argentinean	  government.	  	  This	  can	  be	  reduced	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  faith	  in	  any	  strong	  civilian	  political	  and	  governmental	  institutions	  in	  Argentina,	  which	  made	  the	  US	  feel	  safer	  and	  justified	  in	  supporting	  Argentina's	  strongest,	  most	  established	  institution,	  the	  military,	  in	  its	  ascension	  to	  power,	  despite	  the	  atrocities	  that	  the	  military	  would	  inevitably	  come	  to	  commit.	  
In	  Mexico,	  it	  was	  quite	  common	  for	  promising	  officers	  to	  receive	  training	  from	  the	  US.	  	  In	  the	  late	  1950’s	  and	  early	  1960’s	  41	  percent	  of	  Mexico’s	  generals	  had	  trained	  abroad,	  while	  only	  5	  percent	  of	  all	  officers	  were	  given	  the	  opportunity.	  	  Additionally,	  90	  percent	  of	  these	  generals	  received	  their	  foreign	  training	  from	  the	  US.147	  	  However,	  despite	  the	  large	  proportion	  of	  high-­‐ranking	  officers	  in	  the	  Mexican	  army,	  there	  were	  never	  any	  attempts	  at	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a	  military	  coup	  within	  Mexico	  after	  the	  1920's.	  	  The	  extreme	  professionalization	  and	  discipline	  within	  the	  Mexican	  army	  meant	  that	  any	  supplemental	  training	  received	  abroad	  served	  only	  to	  enhance	  the	  professionalization	  of	  the	  officers	  who	  received	  it,	  rather	  than	  teaching	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  protect	  Mexican	  society	  from	  internal	  enemies	  at	  all	  costs.	  	  The	  Mexican	  government's	  institutional	  strength	  and	  ability	  to	  monitor	  internal	  threats	  were	  enough	  to	  convince	  the	  US	  that	  its	  closest	  neighbors	  were	  safe	  from	  subversive	  threats	  even	  during	  moments	  of	  crisis	  such	  as	  the	  1968	  student	  protests.	  	  Mexican	  military	  professional	  values	  and	  training	  negated	  any	  US	  training	  that	  could	  otherwise	  have	  promoted	  an	  intervention	  into	  the	  Mexican	  political	  sphere,	  and	  ensured	  that	  the	  Mexican	  military	  maintained	  its	  undying	  allegiance	  to	  the	  office	  of	  the	  presidency.	  	  The	  US	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  Mexican	  military	  show	  that	  the	  high	  level	  of	  professionalization	  inspired	  by	  the	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  Mexican	  government,	  was	  enough	  to	  keep	  the	  US	  feeling	  safe	  in	  the	  Mexican	  civilian	  government's	  ability	  to	  ward	  off	  internal	  threats,	  and	  keep	  the	  country	  from	  falling	  prey	  to	  internal	  instability	  and	  threats.	  
Populist	  leaders	  in	  Argentina	  consolidated	  their	  power	  outside	  of	  government	  offices	  and	  institutions,	  which	  created	  a	  legitimate	  opening	  for	  the	  highly	  institutionalized	  military	  to	  enter	  the	  political	  arena.	  	  When	  subversive	  elements	  within	  society,	  including	  some	  of	  these	  populist	  movements	  themselves,	  threatened	  the	  established	  order,	  as	  understood	  by	  the	  armed	  forces,	  the	  military	  used	  its	  high	  level	  of	  institutionalization	  to	  become	  a	  dominant	  actor	  in	  the	  political	  sphere.	  	  The	  institutional	  weakness	  of	  Argentina’s	  government	  is	  best	  demonstrated	  by	  the	  US	  support	  for	  the	  final	  military	  junta,	  accepting	  inevitable	  human	  rights	  abuses	  rather	  than	  trust	  the	  floundering	  and	  nearly	  powerless	  institutions	  of	  the	  civilian	  government	  to	  guard	  against	  communism	  and	  subversion.	  	  On	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the	  flip	  side,	  the	  institutionalization	  of	  Mexico’s	  political	  system	  included	  certain	  portions	  of	  civil	  society	  that	  have	  typically	  been	  seen	  as	  hotbeds	  of	  subversion	  within	  the	  government’s	  official	  structure.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  labor	  unions	  within	  the	  government	  institutionalized	  the	  avenues	  for	  dissent	  available	  to	  this	  important	  portion	  of	  the	  Mexican	  public.	  	  The	  Mexican	  military	  recognized	  that	  the	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  government	  could	  be	  trusted	  to	  manage	  acceptable	  levels	  of	  opposition	  from	  within	  its	  own	  institutions,	  while	  snuffing	  out	  external	  dissent	  that	  superseded	  the	  tolerable	  levels.	  	  The	  confidence	  displayed	  by	  the	  US	  in	  its	  closest	  neighbor’s	  ability	  to	  manage	  conflict	  within	  its	  own	  society	  demonstrates	  the	  strength	  of	  governmental	  institutions	  within	  Mexico,	  and	  the	  control	  that	  they	  were	  able	  to	  exert	  over	  society.	  	  The	  difference	  in	  governmental	  institutional	  strength	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  was	  the	  principal	  reason	  why	  Argentina	  fell	  into	  a	  pattern	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  society	  while	  Mexico	  effectively	  subordinated	  its	  military	  to	  its	  civilian	  government.	  
	  
Conclusions	  
	   This	  study	  has	  traversed	  the	  political	  histories	  of	  Mexico	  and	  Argentina	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  discovering	  what	  allowed	  the	  Mexican	  government	  to	  subordinate	  its	  military	  to	  civilian	  control,	  yet	  forced	  Argentina	  to	  become	  trapped	  in	  a	  vicious	  pattern	  of	  military	  intervention	  in	  government	  that	  had	  terrible	  consequences	  for	  its	  people.	  	  Despite	  a	  myriad	  of	  surface	  similarities	  between	  the	  two	  countries,	  there	  is	  one	  major	  difference	  that	  stands	  out;	  the	  existence	  or	  lack	  of	  strong	  political	  and	  governmental	  institutions.	  	  After	  the	  Mexican	  Revolution,	  Mexico’s	  leaders	  consolidated	  the	  power	  of	  the	  new	  state	  into	  the	  
	   67	  
office	  of	  the	  president,	  and	  placed	  a	  clause	  in	  their	  constitution	  ensuring	  for	  regular	  presidential	  succession	  to	  prevent	  a	  return	  to	  the	  ways	  of	  the	  Porfirian	  dictatorship.	  	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  of	  Mexico’s	  initial	  Presidents	  were	  important	  revolutionary	  generals,	  they	  used	  the	  power	  of	  the	  office	  to	  make	  key	  decisions	  that	  began	  the	  professionalization	  and	  subordination	  of	  the	  Mexican	  military	  to	  the	  civilian	  government,	  and	  specifically	  to	  the	  President	  who	  also	  held	  the	  title	  of	  commander	  and	  chief.	  	  The	  strength	  of	  the	  presidency	  as	  an	  office,	  allowed	  the	  military	  to	  feel	  comfortable	  that	  their	  interests	  would	  be	  best	  advanced	  by	  leaving	  the	  governance	  of	  Mexico	  to	  the	  civilian	  sphere,	  focusing	  instead	  on	  their	  own	  professionalization	  and	  modernization	  efforts.	  	  They	  willingly	  removed	  themselves	  from	  the	  political	  sphere,	  and	  after	  Miguel	  Alemán	  became	  the	  first	  civilian	  president	  in	  1946,	  the	  country	  never	  again	  saw	  a	  military	  leader	  to	  power.	  	  It	  was	  the	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  government	  that	  ensured	  its	  capacity	  to	  manage	  threats	  and	  implement	  policy	  initiatives,	  and	  this	  ability	  to	  rule	  legitimized	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  government’s	  institutions	  over	  society,	  and	  made	  the	  military	  feel	  secure	  in	  its	  subordinate	  position.	  
	   The	  fall	  of	  the	  Rosas	  military	  dictatorship	  in	  Argentina	  did	  not	  lead	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  strong	  system	  of	  political	  institutions	  as	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  Porfirian	  dictatorship	  did	  in	  Mexico.	  	  Rather	  Rosas’	  tendencies	  for	  populist	  mobilization	  and	  dependence	  on	  personal	  relationships	  to	  govern	  established	  a	  pattern	  of	  populist	  movements	  in	  Argentina	  whose	  legitimacies	  were	  based	  in	  popular	  support	  and	  cults	  of	  personalities	  that	  the	  various	  movements’	  leaders	  worked	  hard	  to	  develop.	  	  This	  created	  a	  set	  of	  political	  institutions	  that	  were	  based	  in	  the	  power	  and	  support	  for	  specific	  movements	  and	  leaders,	  rather	  than	  a	  strong	  government	  whose	  institutional	  strength	  a	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leader	  could	  use	  to	  back	  and	  legitimize	  their	  authority	  to	  institute	  and	  enforce	  their	  policies.	  	  A	  pattern	  of	  poor	  governance	  in	  the	  early	  1900’s	  encouraged	  Argentina’s	  military	  to	  intervene	  whenever	  its	  interests	  became	  threatened	  to	  an	  unacceptable	  level,	  from	  which	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  emerged	  of	  institutionally	  weak	  governments	  replacing	  military	  dictatorships	  and	  subsequently	  finding	  themselves	  unable	  to	  establish	  the	  strong	  governmental	  institutions	  necessary	  to	  begin	  the	  subordination	  of	  the	  military,	  which	  would	  result	  in	  a	  return	  to	  military	  rule.	  	  Even	  as	  Perón	  secured	  the	  support	  of	  a	  strong	  majority	  of	  the	  population,	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  craft	  the	  government	  institutions	  necessary	  to	  legitimize	  his	  policies	  outside	  of	  his	  movement,	  and	  his	  threatening	  politics	  led	  to	  his	  eventual	  removal	  from	  office	  in	  the	  same	  ways	  that	  his	  predecessors	  had	  been	  shown	  the	  door.	  	  The	  institutional	  weakness	  of	  Argentina’s	  various	  civilian	  governments	  made	  it	  impossible	  to	  establish	  any	  sort	  of	  legitimate	  authority	  over	  the	  institutionally	  strong	  and	  capable	  military,	  who	  used	  their	  own	  institutional	  strength	  as	  a	  legitimizing	  feature	  during	  their	  interventions	  in	  government.	  	  In	  comparing	  the	  cases	  of	  Mexico	  and	  Argentina,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  most	  important	  determinant	  in	  the	  civilian	  government’s	  ability	  to	  subordinate	  the	  military	  to	  its	  control	  was	  the	  strength	  of	  its	  governmental	  institutions	  as	  they	  legitimized	  the	  idea	  and	  practice	  of	  civilian	  government	  and	  authority	  in	  the	  minds	  of	  society	  and	  the	  military.	  
	   Initial	  research	  seems	  to	  show	  that	  this	  conclusion	  could	  likely	  be	  supported	  on	  a	  broader	  conceptual	  scale.	  	  In	  India,	  after	  the	  end	  of	  British	  colonial	  rule,	  an	  institutionally	  strong	  government	  was	  founded	  along	  with	  the	  Congress	  Party,	  who’s	  representatives,	  like	  the	  PRI,	  would	  come	  to	  dominate	  Indian	  politics	  for	  most	  of	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  20th	  century.	  	  The	  dominance	  of	  the	  Congress	  Party	  in	  Indian	  government	  provided	  stability	  for	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a	  country	  that	  was	  figuring	  out	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  legacies	  of	  colonialism,	  and	  move	  on	  to	  form	  their	  own	  government.148	  Though	  the	  consolidation	  of	  power	  in	  the	  new	  government	  took	  time,	  India	  was	  fortunate	  in	  that	  all	  Indian	  officers	  serving	  in	  the	  army	  at	  the	  time	  of	  transition	  were	  young	  and	  posed	  no	  real	  political	  threat.	  	  As	  the	  army	  had	  been	  dependent	  on	  British	  support	  and	  leadership,	  it	  was	  institutionally	  far	  weaker	  than	  the	  new	  government,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  possibility	  that	  the	  armed	  forces	  could	  legitimately	  attempt	  to	  enter	  into	  the	  political	  realm	  while	  still	  performing	  their	  basic	  defense	  functions.149	  As	  the	  government	  and	  Congress	  Party	  consolidated	  their	  power	  over	  the	  state,	  the	  military	  was	  effectively	  subordinated	  to	  the	  government’s	  rule	  through	  a	  combination	  of	  removal	  from	  government,	  reduction	  in	  prestige	  and	  value	  of	  a	  military	  career,	  which	  kept	  the	  upper	  classes	  and	  therefore	  interests	  out	  of	  the	  ranks	  of	  the	  military,	  and	  an	  emphasis	  on	  diplomacy	  in	  foreign	  relations	  rather	  than	  the	  use	  of	  force.150	  	  Additionally,	  the	  government’s	  ability	  to	  legislate,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  willingness	  to	  involve	  the	  military	  in	  the	  repression	  of	  internal	  threats	  when	  necessary	  helped	  the	  military	  to	  trust	  the	  Indian	  government	  to	  protect	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  state.151	  	  The	  institutional	  strength	  that	  the	  Indian	  government	  came	  to	  develop	  helped	  the	  military	  trust	  that	  the	  government	  could	  rule	  effectively	  while	  protecting	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  Indian	  state,	  and	  was	  certainly	  a	  factor	  in	  India’s	  ability	  to	  subordinate	  the	  armed	  forces	  to	  civilian	  control.	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   The	  victory	  of	  the	  communists	  in	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Revolution	  was	  as	  much	  a	  military	  one	  as	  it	  was	  political.	  	  Once	  in	  power,	  Chairman	  Mao	  recognized	  that	  the	  while	  the	  army	  was	  key	  to	  the	  Party’s	  ability	  to	  maintain	  power,	  it	  was	  necessary	  that	  the	  armed	  forces	  be	  subordinate	  to	  the	  party	  itself	  in	  order	  to	  advance	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  party	  rather	  than	  some	  other	  sector	  of	  society.152	  	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  communist	  societies	  are	  typically	  viewed	  as	  having	  party-­‐army	  relations,	  when	  the	  military	  becomes	  an	  instrument	  of	  the	  party	  and	  the	  two	  organizations	  develop	  a	  symbiotic	  relationship,	  rather	  than	  any	  form	  of	  traditional	  civil	  military	  relations.	  While	  communist	  China	  generally	  followed	  this	  form	  of	  party	  army	  relations	  for	  much	  of	  its	  history,	  the	  events	  in	  Tiananmen	  Square	  in	  1989,	  in	  which	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  officers	  objected	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  armed	  forces	  in	  repressing	  the	  protestors,	  led	  high	  ranking	  party	  members	  to	  reevaluate	  the	  type	  of	  control	  that	  the	  party	  had	  over	  the	  army.153	  	  
Following	  Tiananmen	  Square,	  significant	  changes	  began	  to	  occur	  in	  the	  relations	  between	  the	  Chinese	  Communist	  Party	  (CCP)	  and	  the	  military.	  	  Officers	  have	  now	  been	  promoted	  based	  more	  on	  merit	  than	  for	  political	  reasons,	  which	  has	  increasingly	  professionalized	  the	  officer	  corps.154	  	  Additionally,	  by	  2003,	  no	  senior	  party	  leaders	  had	  any	  prior	  military	  experience,	  signifying	  a	  shift	  away	  from	  military	  involvement	  in	  key	  decisions	  for	  the	  Chinese	  state.155	  	  Finally,	  there	  has	  been	  a	  significant	  disengagement	  of	  China’s	  military	  from	  internal	  security	  issues	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  larger	  focus	  on	  professionalization	  and	  foreign	  defense.156	  These	  changes	  were	  mandated	  by	  the	  CCP’s	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leadership,	  and	  enforced	  by	  the	  party’s	  unquestioned	  authority	  within	  China.	  	  This	  authority	  and	  ability	  to	  rule	  stems	  from	  the	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  CCP.	  	  Without	  a	  strong	  institutional	  government	  whose	  decisions	  carry	  legitimacy	  in	  Chinese	  society,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	  the	  Chinese	  military	  would	  have	  willingly	  allowed	  itself	  to	  be	  removed	  from	  the	  political	  sphere,	  especially	  since	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  the	  army	  in	  Tiananmen	  was	  not	  widely	  supported.	  	  The	  institutional	  strength	  of	  the	  CCP	  gave	  legitimacy	  to	  its	  decisions,	  and	  likely	  helped	  the	  military	  feel	  comfortable	  in	  removing	  itself	  from	  the	  political	  realm,	  despite	  its	  high	  level	  of	  participation	  up	  until	  that	  point.	  
In	  Taiwan	  and	  South	  Korea,	  the	  development	  of	  strong	  democratic	  institutions	  in	  which	  the	  political	  elites	  agreed	  not	  to	  involve	  the	  military	  as	  a	  political	  actor,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  strong	  civil	  society	  helped	  subordinate	  the	  military	  to	  civilian	  control.157	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  despite	  the	  formal	  exit	  of	  the	  military	  from	  Indonesian	  politics,	  the	  military	  remains	  an	  important	  political	  force.	  	  It	  is	  common	  for	  retired	  generals	  to	  serve	  in	  political	  office,	  and	  civilian	  leaders	  commonly	  court	  military	  leaders	  for	  political	  support.	  	  All	  of	  this	  has	  damaged	  the	  attempts	  to	  truly	  democratize	  the	  country	  and	  there	  has	  been	  little	  establishment	  of	  strong	  governmental	  institutions	  outside	  of	  the	  military’s	  influence.158	  While	  more	  research	  certainly	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  on	  all	  of	  these	  cases,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  the	  existence	  of	  strong	  political	  and	  governmental	  institutions	  are	  strongly	  correlated	  to	  the	  subordination	  of	  a	  country’s	  military.	  	  In	  Mexico,	  the	  development	  of	  these	  strong	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